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Résumé
Résumé
Cette thèse utilise la théorie des jeux pour comprendre le comportement des usagers
dans les réseaux sociaux. Trois problématiques y sont abordées: "Comment maximiser
la popularité des contenus postés dans les réseaux sociaux?";" Comment modéliser
la répartition des messages par sujets?";"Comment minimiser la propagation d’une
rumeur et maximiser la diversité des contenus postés?".
Après un état de l’art concernant ces questions développé dans le chapitre 1, ce travail
traite, dans le chapitre 2, de la manière d’aborder l’environnement compétitif pour
accroître la visibilité. Dans le chapitre 3, c’est le comportement des usagers qui est
modélisé, en terme de nombre de messages postés, en utilisant la théorie des approxi-
mations stochastiques. Dans le chapitre 4, c’est une compétition pour être populaire qui
est étudiée. Le chapitre 5 propose de formuler deux problèmes d’optimisation convexes
dans le contexte des réseaux sociaux en ligne. Finalement, le chapitre 6 conclue ce
manuscrit.
Mots-clés
théorie des jeux, réseaux sociaux en ligne, jeux différentiels, approximation stochas-
tique, optimisation convexe, competition pour être populaire, competition pour être vis-
ible, propagation de rumeurs, maximisation de la popularité.
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Abstract
Abstract
This Ph.D. is dedicated to the application of the game theory for the understanding
of users behaviour in Online Social Networks. The three main questions of this Ph.D.
are: " How to maximize contents popularity ? "; " How to model the distribution of
messages across sources and topics in OSNs ? "; " How to minimize gossip propagation
and how to maximize contents diversity? ".
After a survey concerning the research made about the previous problematics in chapter
1, we propose to study a competition over visibility in chapter 2. In chapter 3, we model
and provide insight concerning the posting behaviour of publishers in OSNs by using
the stochastic approximation framework. In chapter 4, it is a popularity competition
which is described by using a differential game formulation. The chapter 5 is dedicated
to the formulation of two convex optimization problems in the context of Online Social
Networks. Finally conclusions and perspectives are given in chapter 6.
Keywords
game theory, online social network, differential game, stochastic approximation,
convex optimization, popularity competition, visibility competition, posting behaviour,
gossip minimization, popularity maximization.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Les réseaux sociaux en ligne font désormais partie de notre vie courante. Il y avait
968 millions d’utilisateurs quotidiens de Facebook, en moyenne, en Juin 2015. En
d’autres termes un septième de la population mondiale utilise Facebook. Ainsi com-
prendre quel est l’impact que peut avoir l’utilisation d’un réseau social par ses abonnés
constitue un défi important. Pour ce faire nous nous proposons de répondre aux trois
problématiques suivantes:
• Comment maximiser la popularité des contenus postés dans les réseaux sociaux?
• Comment modéliser la répartition des messages par sujets?
• Comment minimiser la propagation d’une rumeur et maximiser la diversité des
contenus postés?
Le chapitre 2 est basé sur deux articles . Le premier est "A Time and Space Routing
Game Model applied to Visibility Competition on Online Social Networks" et le second
s’intitule "Game theory approach for modeling competition over visibility on social net-
works". Premièrement, nous proposons dans ce chapitre une mesure de visibilité dans
les réseaux sociaux en ligne. Ensuite, nous présentons notre jeu basé sur la maximisa-
tion de cette mesure de visibilité. Nous prouvons l’unicité de l’équilibre de Nash ainsi
qu’une caractérisation par un problème d’optimisation concave. Ensuite, nous définis-
sons un algorithme décentralisé où chaque utilisateur estime le débit total de messages
dans chaque News Feed et utilise l’algorithme de gradient stochastique afin de mettre à
jour ses propres flux.
Le chapitre 3 est basé sur l’article "Posting behaviour in Social Networks and Con-
tent Active Filtering". Dans ce chapitre, nous avons deux objectifs: d’abord, nous mod-
élisons le nombre de messages postés par les usagers à l’aide de la théorie des approx-
imations stochastiques. Le second objectif est de proposer une strategie de filtrage de
contenu afin d’augmenter la diversité des contenus postés. Nous fournissons une ex-
pression mathématique du point d’équilibre de notre modèle qui est aussi équivalent à
un équilibre de Nash d’un jeu non-coopératif. Enfin, nous illustrons nos résultats grâce
à des simulations numériques et nous les validons avec des données réelles extraites des
réseaux sociaux.
Le chapitre 4 est basé sur le papier "Differential Games of Competition in Online
Content Diffusion ". Dans ce chapitre, nous utilisons la théorie des jeux différentiels
pour modéliser la compétition se passant entre les créateurs de contenus qui paient
le réseau social pour être populaires. Nous utilisons les équation d’Hamilton Jacobi
pour calculer l’équilibre symétrique. Nous montrons qu’une politique bang-bang est un
équilibre de Nash.
Le chapitre 5 est basé sur les papiers "Controlling the Katz-Bonacich Centrality
in Social Network: Application to gossip in Online Social Networks" et "A Con-
tinuous Optimization Approach for Maximizing Content Popularity in Online Social
Networks". Dans ce chapitre, nous considérons deux problèmes d’optimisation. Le
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premier est liée à l’optimisation de la centralité Katz-Bonacich à l’aide d’un contrôle
topologique qui est appelé le problème d’optimisation Katz-Bonacich. Nous mon-
trons d’abord que ce problème est équivalent à un problème d’optimisation linéaire.
La deuxième partie de ce chapitre s’intéresse à l’optimisation de la popularité dans les
réseaux sociaux. Nous modélisons l’évolution de la popularité du contenu en ligne
sur les réseaux sociaus. Nous considérons le problème de maximisation de popularité
lorsqu’un un usager contrôle les sujets associés à ses contenus et joue sur le nombre
de contenus postés afin de maximiser sa popularité globale. Nous démontrons que ce
problème peut être écrit comme un programme fractionnaire "généralisé" et nous four-
nissons un algorithme qui converge vers la solution optimale.
Dans le chapitre 6, nous décrivons les perspectives possibles de notre thèse.
1.1 OSN: an introduction
Online Social Networks (OSNs) are now part of our daily lives. There were 968 million
of active daily Facebook users on average in June 2015, in other words one seventh
of the world population is using Facebook. Thus understanding what is the impact of
an OSN on its subscribers is an important challenge. To this end, the first step is to
define what is an OSN. We adopt the definition of OSNs proposed in [1] with some
small differences. From our perspective, OSNs are websites where users1 can create a
public profile, construct relationships with other users and get information on them in
the most efficient way. The last point is, from our perspective, one of the keys to success
of OSNs (as affirmed in TIME2). More precisely, the first novelty that OSNs bring is the
fact that users can have a massive quantity of "friends" even if they do not know them
in the real world. Indeed, OSNs allow users to see connections between their friends
and proposed friends recommendations [1]. It is therefore easy for a user to find other
people with common interests from all around the world. In an ideal world, OSNs would
dissolve the boundaries of social classes. However, when researchers have observed
friendship relations on real data it shows that the most common connections are between
individuals who already know each other in the offline world [2]. The second novelty
brought by OSNs is the fact that users can maintain a sustainable relationship with each
one of his friends, which is not an easy task knowing that an average user has around
350 friends3. This is achievable because of technological progresses made by OSNs
companies about the selection of relevant information. Indeed, the information that a
1OSN subscribers
2Luckerson, V. (July 9, 2015). Here’s how facebook’s news feed actually works. TIME.
3http://goo.gl/ii71G6
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user receives about his friends are aggregated in a Feed4. Therefore, a user does not
need to visit his friends profile to get a update on them. Depending on the OSN you are
looking at, the name of this feed can change. For instance, on Facebook, it is called a
news feed5 and on Twitter a timeline6. Last year, the OSN Facebook updated its news
feed algorithm seven times 7.
Because of the novelty of OSNs, a new need has arisen to understand them better.
According to [3], the main issues of OSNs are:
How can a company use an OSN efficiently? Behind this wide issue, two major
questions seem to be the key to solve the problem : How to become popular on OSNs?
How to maintain a good reputation in OSNs? The first question will be the topic of a full
section, later on in this thesis. For companies, OSNs are not just an advertisement tool.
Indeed, they can be used to interact with their customers [4]. In France, one example of
a company that succeeded in using OSNs to manage customer relations is Air France8.
How to control spread of gossip in OSNs? Nowadays, everyone is able to have
information about any event, no matter where. For instance, by using the classic infor-
mation channels such as newspapers or, by using OSNs where your friends also provide
some information about the event. However, the second source is not reliable. This
raises the question of gossip detection [5] and how to contain it [6].
How to solve the privacy dilemma in OSNs? One aspect of the privacy dilemma
can be explained as follows. If users want to interact with their friends in OSNs, they
have to share personal information. However, this will generate privacy issues [7]. Thus
the more a user interacts with his friends, the more there is a risk that another user posts
undesired information on his news feed. Moreover, private information has an economic
value and therefore there is a risk that OSNs collect user’s personal information for
commercial purposes.
Also OSNs provide data that can be used to find answers to research issues such as
understanding the diffusion of information. OSNs increase the diffusion of information
and provide important datasets which were not available before [8]. There is an im-
pressive amount of papers about this phenomenon, such as described in the survey [9].
The first and well known topic in it, is the propagation of a unique information (cascade
model [10], SIR model [11]). Nonetheless, in the case of multiple information propaga-
tion, it is not clear how to model negative and positive interactions between the different
propagation processes. In our opinion, the most advanced work around this subject is
[12], which models positive and negative interactions, and where the parameters of the
4Putting together news that come from various friends of a subscriber is called aggregation of posts
in a news feed.
5www.facebook.com/help/210346402339221
6support.twitter.com/articles/227251
7http://goo.gl/uYQEzq
8http://goo.gl/6JgMIo
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model are estimated. Yet, the question of control is not addressed in it.
OSNs are hard and complex entities for the following reasons: First of all, the
description of the content creators’ strategies is puzzling. For instance, content cre-
ators (sources) can use different channels to express their opinions, where groups9 and
pages10 are the majors. In [13], the authors show the importance of posting in the right
community on the OSN Reddit11. These messages (or contents) need to be adapted for
each channel, in what information and communication science call "transmedia". It can
be defined as " [...] stories told across multiple media. At the present time, the most
significant stories tend to flow across multiple media platforms " [14]. When the content
is posted through different medias but it does not adapt its message, it is called "cross-
media". Finally, complex issues can be found for content consumers (readers), which
deal daily with a huge amount of information. The large number of choices that they are
faced makes it difficult to find the information of their interest. This can be illustrated
by the huge number of filtering algorithm proposed in research [15; 16; 17]. Fig. 1.1
attempt to capture the complexity of OSN users’ behaviour.
!"#$%&'( )*+,,&-'( .&+/&$'(
Figure 1.1: OSN entity
In this introduction we present three main issues, all of them belonging to the general
challenges proposed above, and which we will study in this Ph.D. thesis : " How to
maximize contents popularity ? "; " How to model the distribution of messages across
sources and topics in OSNs ? "; " How to minimize gossip propagation and how to
maximize contents diversity? ".
9http://mashable.com/2011/05/01/group-tumblr//
10https://www.facebook.com/pages/create/?ref_type=sitefooter
11reddit.com
19
Chapter 1. Introduction
In section 1.2, we first give an overview of the popularity optimization problem in
which there is a unique source seeking to optimize the popularity of its contents. The
intrinsic variables that increase popularity will be given. Then, we will describe our
approach to tackle the popularity optimization problem.
Section 1.3 will be dedicated to the investigation of the posting behaviour of sources.
We first explain why we assume that the main interest of sources is their contents pop-
ularity. Then we will introduce our game theoretical framework and explain the reason
why it is the best adapted to model the posting behaviour of sources and the nature of
the reached equilibrium.
Finally, section 1.4 will address the issue of gossip propagation and poor content
diversity and then we will describe what kind of control which is possible to apply and
its effect on the equilibrium.
1.2 Maximization of contents popularity
We propose understanding what drives the popularity of contents in OSNs and how to
maximize it12. For companies it is an important issue to solve because they have already
observed that investment in OSNs increases their sales:
"More than half of marketers who’ve been using social media for at least 2 years
report it helped them improve sales.13"
However, even if the usefulness of OSNs was noticed, the number-one challenge mar-
keters are interested in is:
"What social tactics are most effective?"14
This is the reason why understanding how to maximize popularity is of major con-
cern. Firstly we will describe our methodology to tackle the following issue. Secondly
an overview of previous works will be provided.
1.2.1 Definition of popularity
The popularity of a content on OSNs is defined as the number of likes, shares, views,
comments, reactions to the content as suggested in [18]. In fig. 1.2, the popularity
12The associated optimization problem will be called the Popularity maximization problem.
13www.socialmediaexaminer.com/SocialMediaMarketingIndustryReport2015.
pdfp18
14www.socialmediaexaminer.com/SocialMediaMarketingIndustryReport2015.
pdfp6
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evolution of a message posted on Facebook is plotted. This figure suggests two possi-
ble approaches to model the popularity. The first one is to restrict the study of a static
problem which is obtained by computing the expected stationary regime of the popular-
ity. If we do so, it facilitates the introduction of several contents. The second approach
consists of trying to find a mathematical expression which captures the popularity evo-
lution of a content. However, in this case, the question of how to model the interaction
between contents is not fully understood.
Figure 1.2: Example of the popularity evolution of a message posted in Anne Hidalgo’s
Facebook page.
First we study the popularity of contents associated with a particular source by intro-
ducing the visibility of this source. The visibility of a source j in an OSN m is defined as
the proportion of content posted by j in m. We conduct a simple experiment to observe,
whether or not the visibility of a source is correlated to its expected stationary regime
popularity. We extract posted messages by a Facebook page associated with newspaper
companies (Le Monde15, Liberation16, Le Figaro17) by using the Netvizz application
[19]. Our dataset is composed of 63437 messages. The data was collected from January
01 2010 to June 06 2015. For different visibility of the Le Monde, a smooth density
estimate of message popularity (according to a logarithmic scale) is depicted in fig. 1.3.
We observe in this graph that the more the visibility increases the more the number of
popular messages increases.
The visibility approach is the one proposed in chapter 2.
In the second approach proposed in chapter 3, we assume that the expected station-
15https://fr-fr.facebook.com/lemonde.fr
16https://www.facebook.com/Liberation?fref=ts
17https://www.facebook.com/lefigaro?fref=ts
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Figure 1.3: Visibility and Popularity.
ary regime popularity of a particular content could be expressed as a linear combination
of other sources visibility. Therefore we assume that the popularity of a content associ-
ated with a particular source is related to what the other sources are doing. For instance,
if two sources post contents about the same topic but with different information, it is
interesting for a user to read both contents. In this case the visibility of one source has
a positive influence over the popularity of the other source.
In chapter 4, we restrict the study of popularity on a unique content per source. Thus,
in this case a differential equation is used to model the evolution of the popularity.
In chapter 5, we introduce a model that combines the previous approaches. As
suggested in fig. 1.4, we model the popularity evolution of a source by a dynamical
system which receives an impulse when a content is posted.
1.2.2 Control of popularity: an overview
In OSNs literature seven key points to control the improvement of content popularity
have been identified:
• Position in the news feed. The simplest way of increasing popularity for a source
is to improve the visibility of its contents. Visibility can be sustained by a source
if its messages are always at the top of news feed. Indeed, in this case, to be
in the top position allows a source’s message to be seen by a user as soon as
he logs onto the OSN18. There are three major ways of achieving high visibility.
First, by paying OSNs [20], which can increase the probability of being in the
18http://www.nngroup.com/articles/scrolling-and-attention/
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Figure 1.4: Evolution of the cumulative popularity when several contents are posted.
top position19. We use this strategy in chapter 4. Secondly, by the quantity of
messages posted [21] and thirdly by the design of OSNs, when the users can rank
the post (as in Reddit.com).
• The topic and the content of the post. The choice of content and of topic of
each message is crucial for the popularity of a post. In this paper [22] the authors
predict the popularity of a message based on its topic. It is also interesting to
understand the influence that different topics can have on each other. Is it a good
strategy to post a content about "terrorism" followed by a content about "art"?
In [23], the authors have illustrated and studied interactions between different
"epidemics" in OSNs concerning different topics.
• Network concern. It is common knowledge that the popularity of a content de-
pends on who is posting and its degree of influence in the OSN [24]. In this
reference, the position in the network has been proved to be useful to determine
the evolution of content popularity.
• Payment. A pure economic strategy can be adopted, where sources need to de-
cide how much to pay to OSNs to be visible. There are different payment modal-
ities 20, depending on the OSN and different Ad formats 21. Most of the time
auction mechanisms are used [25] to implement the competition between sources.
• Headline. The headline is known as an important feature to become popular.
Indeed, the headline of content will be decisive for a reader to decide whether to
read/watch a content or not. Authors of [13] create a model that predicts the best
19https://www.facebook.com/business/ads-guide/?tab0=Mobile%20News%
20Feed
20https://support.google.com/adsense/answer/160525?hl=en
21https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2467968?hl=en
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headline for a message in the OSN reddit.com.
• Timing. The "when to post" question is an important and complex issue. It is not
enough to give the right time as suggested in [26] because if every source posts
at the same time, then it is unlikely that a source will be in the top position, it
means that it will be less visible. Thus in [27], the authors study, in a game theory
setting, what happens when sources have to decide when to post.
All these controls are to be taken with caution due to unexpectedness phenomenon.
Indeed, because of the power law distribution of contents popularity (as illustrated in
[28]), and the high value of the variance, it is hard to predict the virality of a content.
1.3 Prospection of posting behaviour in OSNs
Understanding the posting behaviour of sources is of main interest. For Internet Service
providers, being able to understand traffic patterns will allow them to design efficient
infrastructures. For the owner of the OSN service providers, it can help to enhance user
experience by improving content filtering action. From companies perspective, under-
standing what drives topics tendency is useful for the understanding of the consumers’
preferences. In this section, we explain the different approaches used to model the post-
ing behaviour. Then we make a survey of the different methods developped to capture
the sources’ behaviour in OSNs. We will describe the approach used during the Ph.D.
thesis to model the posting behaviour of sources.
Firstly we assume the following:
The actions in the OSN taken by the sources are driven by the search for
popularity.
Of course if we restrict our framework to companies that use OSNs as a communica-
tion tool, it is reasonable that they try to become popular. But, we extend this assumption
to other type of users. There is empirical evidence which shows that "classical users"22
look for interaction with their community [29].
One of the main reasons why people will not post is because they think it will be
boring for their friends, and because they will not receive enough attention from their
community. There is also some empirical evidence that newspapers will cover stories
that will be more popular [30]. We validate our hypothesis by a simple experiment,
which measures the impact of popularity over posting behaviour. We can observe in fig.
1.5 the following phenomenon:
"The more I’m popular today, the more I will post tomorrow."
22that use OSNs without any commercial purpose
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Figure 1.5: Popularity vs. number of posts per day
Secondly, we define a model where sources can directly send messages (according
to a Poisson process) to users and users have a variable that measures the interest in
content associated with each source. Moreover, each source can send messages to an-
other source. In order to understand the equilibrium behaviour when several sources try
to maximize their own popularity, the Nash equilibrium seems to be the right mathe-
matical tool. Indeed, the Nash equilibrium concept [31], with all its extensions is often
used in economics and telecommunications. A strategy vector (for instance a specific
arrival rate of messages for each source) is a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve
its utility by a unilateral deviation.
Finally, we propose a second model inspired from queuing theory. We assume that
sources connect to OSN according to a Poisson process and will decide to post or not
a message if they think that its messages will be popular enough. Thus this kind of
model is inspired from queuing theory where users can decide to enter or not in a queue
according to the observed size of it [32]. This model is a stochastic model because
the arrival of users is random, but also because the popularity of content is a random
variable. We use the framework of stochastic approximation in order to model this
posting process.
We now provide an overview of previous works about posting behaviour in OSNs.
The posting behaviour of users has been studied most of the time from a machine learn-
ing perspective. Several approaches can be used. The classical one is to identify the
key features that determine, for instance, the number of messages posted each day. For
instance, in [33] the authors show the importance of two features, the own intrinsic in-
terest and the global temporal context. Yet, even if it seems an issue easy to address,
a little reflection leads to the enumerations of different cases, which appear not to be
linked together. For example, we examine the behaviour of Online Trolling. "Online
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trolling is the practice of behaving in a deceptive, destructive, or disruptive manner in a
social setting on the Internet with no apparent instrumental purpose."23. In this case, it
was proved that motivation behind trolling is fun and sadism [34]. Yet another example
is about the users who post about themselves, who try to fight loneliness [35]. Finally,
our last example is the one of companies, which use OSNs to make advertisements or
to manage customer relations’ [4]. This profusion of goals of sources shows how com-
plex OSNs can be, and illustrates the fact that even the simplest questions can have hard
answers in this context. However, we can notice that in each case, there is a search of
reactions. Indeed, I will not do online trolling if users do not complain about it. I will
not post information about myself in order to regulate my emotions if people do not like
my posts 24. Thus it seems that everyone is trying to be popular, to receive attention
from their community. So popularity could be seen as an important driver to explain the
posting behaviour of sources in OSNs.
1.4 Minimization of gossip propagation and maximiza-
tion of contents diversity
The need to improve the posting behaviour of users is becoming a major issue. Indeed,
the main dangers of OSNs is the propagation of false information.
This is the reason why sometimes, there is the need for a regulatory authority able
to detect rumors [36] and to remove the source of the gossip [37]. For example, if we
observe messages concerning the Boston Marathon ( 8 million relevant tweets concern-
ing this topic25), it can perfectly illustrate the dissemination of misinformation. In the
twenty most popular tweets, 30 % are false information. Another reason for controlling
messages posted by users is to improve the quality of experience of each user. For in-
stance, the regulatory authority can propose a safety net such that unwanted messages
do not appear in the users’ news feed [38]. The last illustration of the need of control is
about helping the creation of newcomer contribution in OSNs. If you are a newcomer
source it is more difficult to get popular, because other sources are already taking all the
attention of readers. The authors, in [39], design a mechanism to increase the popularity
of newcomer source, with the intervention of a regulatory authority. In this section we
first describe how we will control the posting behaviour of users. Then we will present
an overview of research about the improvement of the posting behaviour.
We propose a Content Active Filtering (CAF)26. We define two specific goals for
23Buckels, E. E., Trapnell, P. D., Paulhus, D. L. (2014). Trolls just want to have fun. Personality and
individual Differences, 67, 97-102.
24http://goo.gl/qNBZAz
25http://www.smithsonianmag.com
26where the control is the probability to accept a message from a particular source
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the CAF. We suggest using the CAF in order to increase the diversity of posted con-
tent by trying to provide an equal access to content for everyone. We are interested in
the minimization of the propagation of a gossip by removing nodes. We assume that
the regulatory authority can block some nodes in the Social Network. For instance,
by sending a warning to the friends of a user, the control can disturb communication
between users. The minimization of the gossip process is proved to be equivalent to a
convex optimization problem.
CAF already exists in many OSNs. Indeed, in the case of Facebook, until 2011,
EdgeRank was the name of the algorithm used by Facebook to determine what content
should appear in a user’s news feed. Usually CAF has a main objective which is the
satisfaction of users. Papers [40], [38] propose a filter algorithm based on user profiles,
without taking into account the overall popularity of the feed. However, none of these
works were designed for OSN. In the paper [41], the authors introduce the popularity of
contents in their proposal. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that a CAF
is used to improve diversity and to decrease gossip.
1.5 Mathematical tools and mathematical contributions
This section is dedicated to the description of the mathematical tools used in this Ph.D.
thesis.
1.5.1 Game theory
Firstly we applied and adapt, in chapter 2, the theory of atomic congestion games with
splittable stocks [42] to visibility competition on OSNs. A congestion game is defined
as follows: There is a finite number of players J ∈ {1, . . . ,J} and a finite number of
links C ∈ {1, . . . ,C}. Each player j ∈ J has a demand φ j > 0 to split between the
links, where λ jc is the proportion of φ j send by player j ∈ J in link c ∈ C . The total
loss of a player j is defined as
C
∑
c=1
λ jcDc(
J
∑
i=1
λic),
where Dc(
J
∑
i=1
λic) is the loss associated with link c ∈ C which depends on the total
flow
J
∑
i=1
λic. In chapter 1, we demonstrate that the total loss associated with a visibility
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competition is given by the following function:
C
∑
c=1
λ jc
[
γ jc −Dc(
C
∑
d=1
J
∑
i=1
λ jd)
]
. (1.1)
It can be noticed that the loss in congestion game is slightly different than the loss
associated with a visibility competition, and we cannot use some important properties
as the concavity properties. However, in chapter 2, we managed to prove the uniqueness
of the interior Nash equilibrium and we propose a learning algorithm that converges to
the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Secondly, in chapter 4, we use differential game theory [43], to model a competition
between sources who wish to see their content become popular. The differential game
theory comes from the optimal control theory [44].
1.5.2 Stochastic dynamical systems
Firstly we use the theory of stationary point process to model the number of messages
posted the sources [45].
Secondly, in chapter 3, we use stochastic approximation theory [46] to model the
posting behavior of users. A stochastic approximation scheme is given by:
x(n+ 1) = x(n)+ a(n)[h(x(n))+M(n+ 1)], n ≥ 0, (1.2)
with for each n ≥ 0, x(n) ∈ RI , M(n+1) ∈ RI is a martingale difference sequence with
respect to the increasing family of σ -fields F (n) := σ(xm,M(n + 1),m ≤ n). This
scheme can be seen as a noisy approximation of the following system of differential
equation:
dx(t)
dt
= h(x(t)), t ≥ 0.
Moreover, the model in chapter 3 can be seen as a stochastic extension of the Degroot
model [47; 48] with a signed matrix.
1.6 Organization of the document
Chapter 2 is based on two papers. The first one is "A Time and Space Routing Game
Model applied to Visibility Competition on Online Social Networks" and the second one
is "Game theory approach for modeling competition over visibility on social networks".
First, we propose a visibility measure on a news feed. Next, we present our game based
on visibility measures, which is similar to the Weighted Allocation Game. Following
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this consideration, we provide the uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium, a characteri-
zation via concave programming, and its closed form. We propose a two time scale
decentralized algorithm where each user estimates the total flow of messages in each
News Feed and uses stochastic gradient algorithm to update their own flows. Finally,
we propose an extension of our model where a sharing strategy is added.
Chapter 3 is based on the paper "Posting behaviour in Social Networks and Content
Active Filtering". In this chapter, we have two objectives: First we model the posting
behaviour of publishers in OSNs which have externalities, and the second objective is
to propose content active filtering in order to increase content diversity from different
publishers. By externalities, we mean that when the quantity of posted contents from
a specific publisher impacts the popularity of other posted contents. We introduce a
dynamical model to describe the posting behaviour of publishers taking into account
these externalities. Our model is based on stochastic approximations and sufficient con-
ditions are provided to ensure its convergence to a unique rest point. We provide a
close form of this rest point and show that it can be obtained as the unique equilib-
rium of a non-cooperative game. Content Active Filtering (CAF) are actions taken by
the administrator of the Social Network in order to promote some objectives related to
the quantity of contents posted in various contents. As objective of the CAF we shall
consider maximizing the diversity of posted contents. Finally, we illustrate our results
through numerical simulations and we validate them with real data extracted from social
networks.
Chapter 4 is based on the paper "Differential Games of Competition in Online Con-
tent Diffusion". In this chapter, we use the theory of differential game to model the
competition between a source who pay the OSN to get their content visible. The cu-
mulative popularity of a content is modeled by using a differential equation and we
use Hamilton Jacobi Equations to compute the symmetric equilibrium. We prove that a
bang-bang policy is a Nash equilibrium.
Chapter 5 is based on the paper "Controlling the Katz-Bonacich Centrality in Social
Network: Application to gossip in Online Social Networks" and on "A Continuous Op-
timization Approach for Maximizing Content Popularity in Online Social Networks".
In this chapter, we consider two optimization problems. The first one is related to the
optimization of the Katz-Bonacich centrality using a topological control which is called
the Katz-Bonacich optimization problem. We first prove that this problem is equiv-
alent to a linear optimization problem. Thus, in the context of large graphs, we can
use algorithms such as Simplex algorithm. We provide a specific applications of the
Katz-Bonacich centrality minimization problem based on the minimization of gossip
propagation and make experiments on real networks. The second section of the chapter
is concerned with popularity optimization in OSN. We model the evolution of content
popularity on Online Social Networks considering the following property: most of the
popularity (influence, likes, number of views) of a content is obtained while the content
is in the first position in the news feed of an OSN. This property is checked on a real
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dataset and therefore a mathematical optimization model of the cumulative popularity
is proposed. We consider the popularity maximization problem in which a source of
contents controls the topics of its contents and the number of posts in order to maxi-
mize its overall popularity. We demonstrate that the popularity maximization problem
can be written as a "generalized" fractional program and we provide an algorithm that
converges to the optimal solution.
In chapter 6, we give the conclusion of our Ph.D. thesis and we describe possible
perspectives.
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This chapter is based on two papers A Time and Space Routing Game Model applied
to Visibility Competition on Online Social Networks and Game theory approach for
modeling competition over visibility on social networks.
2.1 Introduction
Lately, new questions concerning OSNs and the visibility of its contents are attracting
the attention of researchers. For each user or company that wants to become popular
and visible in OSNs, answers to the following questions seem to be essential: Where
and when should messages be posted? On what topic? How many messages should
a company post? In this chapter we consider that these questions have to be treated
following a competitive scenario, since there are several users/companies aiming to be-
come popular on a common OSNs. Routing game theory [49] seems to be an interesting
tool to answer these questions. So far, to our knowledge, only one paper has adopted
the routing game theory to solve problems concerning OSNs [15].
We propose a model where the sources control the flow of messages sent in a news
feed and try to maximize the visibility of their posted messages. We assume that content
visibility in a news feed is positively correlated with content popularity. In the case of
Facebook, a news feed is a Feed where the user’s friends are published. These posts are
displayed in chronological order from the newest to the oldest. It is possible to find in
the introduction of [21] more definitions of a news feed.
The reason why we use Routing game theory is because, for a source, the maximiza-
tion of message visibility is equivalent to the minimization of a delay function. Routing
game theory supposes a game where players have to decide where they send their flows
of data. In this sense, the player’s flow has the splittable property. In OSNs sources can
choose to post messages in different news feeds. Another property of routing games is
the congestion property. Mathematically speaking, this property can be explained by
the fact that the utility of a player on a link decreases in the total amount of flow sent
on this link. This congestion property is also found in OSNs, when the visibility of a
message decreases on the total flow of messages on this OSN.
In section 2.2, we present the latest related works concerning game theory applied
to competition over visibility in OSNs. Then, in the case of our model, we present the
mathematical models that are similar to ours.
In this chapter, we consider that sources can post in several news feeds, and concern-
ing different topics. In section 2.3, we propose a visibility measure and we also develop
the routing game associated.
There is a difference between the routing games defined in this chapter and classical
routing games [49]. This is why we adapt the mathematical framework of [49] to the
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Routing game defined in this chapter. We develop it in section 2.4. First, we demonstrate
the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Then, we prove that at the Nash equilibrium,
under some hypothesis, a source only sends messages about a unique topic per news
feed. Moreover, we give a characterization of the Nash equilibrium based on Concave
Programming and we prove its uniqueness.
Section 2.5 deals with more practical issues. Indeed, the routing game theory de-
veloped in [50] provides existence and uniqueness results about the Nash equilibrium.
However, it does not propose realistic decentralized learning algorithm that converges
to it. However, based on the results of 2.4 , we are able to provide the convergence of a
decentralized mechanism to the Nash equilibrium.
Finally, in section 2.6, we extend the model to study rerouting of posts, which cor-
responds to sharing content.
2.2 Related works
2.2.1 Related models
Studies concerning users/companies that want to become visible on OSN news feeds
have been recently treated in [50] and [21]. This is not the usual way of modeling
competition over visibility on OSNs. Usually there are two approaches. The first one
is the advertising allocation. In this case, sources can choose to pay OSNs in order
to get their content promoted. Papers about this subject are often linked to marketing
differential games [51; 52; 53]. The second one is to consider an epidemic process on
an OSN. In this case, the question would concern which node a source would need to
use in order to maximize the spread of its contents [54; 55; 56].
In [21] the authors use a Poisson process to model the flow of messages on a unique
news feed. However, it can be expected that the Poisson process assumption does not fit
with a realistic scenario. That’s the reason why we model the flow of messages of each
source by a Stationary Point Process, as it is proposed in [50]. This model would allow
sources to post on different news feeds and concerning different topics.
2.2.2 Related mathematical results
Under some hypothesis, and from the fact that at equilibrium player’s messages con-
cern only one topic per news feed, the game that we study in this chapter is similar to
the game defined in [57]. This game is called Weighted Allocation game and could be
defined as follows: Let {K1, . . . ,KL} be a set of resources that is shared among J strate-
gic users. Each user proposes a bid λ jl ∈ [0,λ ] for each resource l. Each resource is
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Table 2.1: Main notations used throughout the chapter 2 until section 2.6
Symbol Meaning
J number of sources
C number of topics
N jc stationary point process that counts the number of messages posted by
source j about topic c
λ jc intensity of the stationary point process N jc; λ j := (λ j1, . . . ,λ jC)
λ jc ∈ [0,λ ], with λ < ∞
γ jc preference of user j over visibility of topic c; γ
∗
j = maxc
{γ jc}
γ0 linear cost associated with the creation of messages; Γ :=
J
∑
i=1
γ0
γ∗i
assumed to be shared proportionally to the bids, so that the amount of resource l that
player j receives is given by:
Kl
λ jl
∑i λil
,
and each player j has a linear cost γ0 for his bid. Finally, his objective function is given
by:
U(λ j,λ− j) = ∑
l
γl
λ jl
∑i λil
− γ0 ∑
l
λ jl ,
where λ j := (λ j1, . . . ,λ jL) and λ− j := (λ1, . . . ,λ j−1,λ j+1, . . . ,λJ). The authors, in [57],
prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium. Also, they study efficiency measurements
and they provide learning algorithms concerning the Nash equilibrium. The utility func-
tion in this chapter does not have the same mathematical form as the one of the Weighted
Allocation game, indeed, in the game we consider, the utility is:
U(λ j,λ− j) =
∑l γ jlλ jl
∑i,l λil
− γ0 ∑
l
λ jl .
In our case, we prove the uniqueness and the characterization of the equilibrium based
on the routing game model. Concerning the learning algorithm, considerable works
have been done to provide learning algorithm in Allocation games [57; 58; 59; 60; 61]
and in routing games [49; 62]. We propose a new algorithm based on a decentralized
scheme proposed in [63].
2.3 Model
The main symbols used in the chapter, until section 2.6 are reported in Tab. 2.1.
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2.3.1 Creation of a visibility measure on a news feed
In this section, we define a measure of visibility of a source j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,J} in a news
feed. A news feed in an OSN is a continuous transmission of data in the user’s personal
account. The content of this data comes from other users and pages that the user choses
to be subscribed to. We consider that the messages in a news feed of users are ordered
from the newest to the oldest. This type of news feed configuration can be found in the
most popular OSNs, like Twitter, Facebook and Tumblr. In order to model the visibility
of a content in a news feed, we uses the theory of Point Processes [45]. As a first
step, each source j is associated with a stationary point process N j which represents the
messages sent by source j in the news feed. With the help of this model, a first visibility
measure of the content of j is proposed. Then we distinguish messages by topic and our
final measure of visibility of a source j is given.
Since most web users give more attention to the information above the page fold1,
we focus our visibility measure on the first message of the news feed. The arrival
time of any message in the news feed of users is modeled by a stationary point process
(N,θt ,P), where θt is the associated flow, P the associated probability measure and
λ := E[N(0,1]] the intensity of the process with 0 < λ < ∞. Tn denotes the arrival time
of the nth message. We define the sequence of mark {Zn}n associated with (N,θt ,P)
with Zn ∈ {1, . . . ,J} for all n. Zn tell us the origin of the n
th message. We define the
continuous process Z(t) where Z(t) = Zn if t ∈ (Tn,Tn+1]. We define a new process N j:
N j((a,b]) := ∑
n∈Z
1{Zn= j}1{Tn∈(a,b]}. (2.1)
This process counts the number of messages from j during the interval (a,b]. We as-
sume that the intensity of this new process is λ j, with 0 < λ j < ∞. We consider that the
visibility measure of a source j at time t is given by:
lim
h→0
P(Z(T+(t)) = j | N((t, t + h]) ≥ 1) (2.2)
where T+(t) = t + in f{h | N((t, t + h]) = 1}.
This measure is the probability that, when a message arrives in the news feed, it
comes from source j. The next proposition gives an explicit formula for this probability
based on palm probability theory.
Proposition 2.1. For all t and for all j,
lim
h→0
P(Z(T+(t)) = j | N((t, t + h]) ≥ 1) =
λ j
∑i λi
. (2.3)
1http://www.nngroup.com/articles/scrolling-and-attention
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The fact that we restrict our measure to arrival time allows us to have an explicit
form for any stationary point process. Moreover, the visibility measure of the source j
gives the proportion of messages that comes from j in all the news feed content.
We next consider the topics treated in messages. We propose that a message can give
information about a topic c, c ∈ {1, . . . ,C}. We must therefore define for each c a point
process (Nc,θt ,Pc) of intensity λc. We assume that each (Nc,θt ,Pc) and (Nc′ ,θt ,Pc) are
independent. This is why by defining Zc, N jc and λ jc as previously, we can prove that:
lim
h→0
P(Zc(T+(t)) = j | N((t, t + h]) ≥ 1) =
λ jc
∑i ∑c′ λic′
. (2.4)
We consider that Vjc :=
λ jc
∑i ∑c′ λic′
is a measure of the visibility of contents posted by j
about topic c.
2.3.2 Game model applied to OSN
Due to the presence of many sources wishing to be visible in OSNs news feeds, we
define a non-cooperative game between them. Firstly, the strategies of sources is de-
scribed. Secondly, the utility of each player is given. We propose the utility of a player
as the weighted sum of measures of visibility.
Source’s Strategies: The strategy vector of the source j is λ j = (λ j1, . . . ,λ jC). We
assume that a source can only send an expected limited number of messages per time
unit. Thus, for each j and each c, λ jc ∈ [0,λ ].
Source’s Utility: In order to define the utility of a source, we recall the visibility
measure vector of j is given by:
V j = (
λ j1
∑i ∑c′ λic′
, . . . ,
λ jC
∑i ∑c′ λic′
). (2.5)
Each source j has a linear cost given by λcost := γ0 ∑
c′
λ jc′ associated with the creation
of messages. The utility of source j is a weighted sum of the visibilities measures of j
minus its cost:
U j(λ j,λ− j) =
[
∑c γ jcλ jc
∑i ∑c′ λic′
]
− γ0 ∑
c′
λ jc′ , (2.6)
where λ− j := (λ1, . . . ,λ j−1,λ j+1, . . . ,λJ). In the next section, our interest turns to study
the game that we defined previously.
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2.4 Game study
In this section, we study the properties of Nash equilibrium. To start with, we provide
some characterizations of it. Next, we prove that at any Nash equilibrium, each player
sends messages about a unique topic. At this point we characterize Nash equilibrium
via Concave Programming. Finally, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is proved,
a closed form is provided and the price of anarchy is studied.
The concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) is defined as follows:
Definition 2.2. (λ NE1 , . . . ,λ
NE
J ) is a NE iff for all j:
U j(λ
NE
j ,λ
NE
− j ) = max
λ j∈[0,λ ]
U j(λ j,λ
NE
− j ). (2.7)
In other words, a source has no interest in changing his intensity unilaterally at the
Nash equilibrium. The existence of at least one NE is not clear. The utility function
U j(·,λ− j) is not concave in λ j. However, this game has several important properties.
Firstly, at the NE at least one source sends messages in the news feed as it is stated in
the next proposition.
Proposition 2.3. The decision vector (0, . . . ,0) is not a Nash equilibrium.
Secondly, we prove that if a source for a specific OSN has no equal preferences on
two different topics then it only sends messages that concern the unique topic that it
prefers the most. We first impose the following assumption:
(H1) There exists a NE such that for all j and c, λ NEjc < λ .
The assumption (H1) characterizes situations where an equilibrium exists such
that any source cannot saturate its upper constraints. The next proposition states the
expected result:
Proposition 2.4. Consider a source j, two topics (c,c′) and γ jc > γ jc′ . Then for any
λ NEjc and λ
NE
jc′ that verified (H1),
λ NEjc = 0, λ
NE
jc′ = 0 (2.8)
or
λ NEjc > 0, λ
NE
jc′ = 0. (2.9)
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We define a new hypothesis:
(H2) For each source j and topics c and c′, we have γ jc 6= γ jc′ .
According to the previous proposition, when a source maximize its visibility it is
optimal for him to send messages about a unique topic, which is harmful in terms of
content diversity in OSNs. More precisely, with the help of (H2) we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 2.5. Consider that (H1) and (H2) are satisfied. Then for each j there exists a
unique c j ∈ {1, . . . ,C} such that γ
∗
j = max
c′
{γ jc′}. Therefore c j = argmax c′{γ jc′}. Then
for j and l associated with c, λ NEjc j ≥ 0 and for all c
′ 6= c j, λ
NE
jc′ = 0. In this case the
payoff of a player j can be rewritten in the following manner:
U j(λ j,λ− j) =
[
γ∗j λ j
∑i λi
]
− γ0λ j. (2.10)
The previous corollary provides assumptions such that the game defined in this
chapter is equivalent to the generalized Kelly mechanism [64]. With the help of
corollary 2.5, U(·,λ− j) is concave in λ jc j ∈ [0,λ ] and so the existence theorem from
[65] can be applied. Moreover, λ NE > 0 is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for each j,
∂U j
∂λ j
(λ NEj ,λ
NE
− j ) = 0. This game has been well-studied, however, we propose deriving
new results about uniqueness by using tools from routing game theory. The next
theorem provides a new characterization of Nash equilibrium. We prove that, at a Nash
equilibrium, the sum of messages flow, in other words ∑
i
λ NEici , is the unique solution of
a concave optimization problem.
Theorem 2.6. Consider that (H1) and (H2) are satisfied. If λ NE = (λ NE1 , . . . ,λ
NE
J ) >
0 is a NE then ∑
i
λ NEici is the unique solution of the following concave optimization
problem:
max
Λ∈[0,Jλ ]
(J−1) log(Λ)−ΓΛ, (2.11)
with Γ = ∑
i
γ0
γ∗i
.
This new characterization is fundamental to prove the main result of this chap-
ter. With it we prove the uniqueness of the interior Nash equilibrium because λ NEjc j
is uniquely defined by λ NEl := ∑
i
λ NEici .
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Theorem 2.7. Consider that (H1) and (H2) are satisfied. Let λ NE1 > 0 and λ
NE
2 > 0 be
two Nash equilibria. Under these assumptions, for all j
λ NE1 = λ
NE
2 .
In the next proposition, a closed form of the equilibrium is given.
Proposition 2.8. Consider that (H1) and (H2) are satisfied. If there exists a Nash
equilibrium such that λ NE > 0, and if for all j,
γ∗j >
(J−1)
(∑i
1
γ∗i
)
, (2.12)
then
λ NEjc j =
(J−1)
γ0(∑i
1
γ∗i
)
[
1−
1
γ∗j
(J−1)
(∑i
1
γ∗i
)
]
. (2.13)
Moreover
U j(λ
NE
j ,λ− j
NE) = (1−
γ0
γ∗j
(J−1)
(∑i
1
γ∗i
)
)(γ∗j −
(J−1)
γ0(∑i
1
γ∗i
)
).
In the previous theorem, there is a condition (2.12) over the cost γ∗j all j such that
λ jc j > 0 for all j. If this condition is not satisfied, intensities can be equal to 0 at
equilibrium for some sources. This result is described in the next theorem. Given the
explicit expression of the Nash equilibrium of the game, we are able to understand
better the behaviour of the equilibrium when the parameters of the game change. Thus
from proposition 2.8, it can be noticed that for all source j, the intensity λ jc j is strictly
increasing in γ∗j and quadratic concave in J.
Thus we can now compute a general form of the equilibrium and not just re-
strict ourselves to an equilibrium where γ∗j >
(J−1)
(∑i
1
γ∗i
)
, in other words when all λ NEj
are positive. We rearrange the sources from the smallest
γ0
γ∗j
to the largest, such that
γ0
γ∗1
>
γ0
γ∗2
> .. . >
γ0
γ∗j
.
Theorem 2.9. Assume that j′ is such that j′ = max{ j | γ∗j <
(J−1)
(∑Ji= j
1
γ∗i
)
} i.e j′ is the
source with the largest
γ0
γ∗j
who does not send any messages in the news feed. In this
case the Nash equilibrium is uniquely defined by:



λ NEjc j =
(J′−1)
γ0(∑
J
i= j′+1
1
γ∗i
)
[
1−
1
γ∗j
(J′−1)
(∑Ji= j′+1
1
γ∗i
)
]
,
λ NEjc j = 0, ∀ j ≤ j
′,
(2.14)
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where J′ = J− | {1, . . . , j′} |.
After having proved the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and characterizing the
NE, the next section is dedicated to a learning mechanism that converges to the sym-
metric Nash equilibrium.
2.5 Learning algorithm for symmetric sources
In this section we study a decentralized algorithm that converges to the NE given pre-
viously.The game does not admit a potential function in the sense of [66], and does
not verify the submodularity property [67] for J > 2 and L > 2. Thus, we cannot use
conventional tools of game theory to find out decentralized learning algorithm. Finding
a decentralized algorithm is a well-known challenging issue in the context of routing
game [42]. First, with the help of the theorem 2.6 and the proposition 2.8, we are able
to design a singularly perturbated algorithm where:
- Each source imitates the average behaviour of all sources on each news feed,
- The source uses a gradient scheme to compute its optimal strategy.
This decentralized scheme has already been used in [63] in the case of distributed de-
terministic and stochastic gradient optimization algorithms. We are able to prove the
convergence of this decentralized algorithm to the interior equilibrium which is, in the
symmetric case the Nash equilibrium.
We assume throughout this section that (H1) and (H2) are satisfied. From (H2)
and corollary 2.5, we restrict the learning algorithm to only one topic per news feed.
Moreover we assume that for each j and c, λ jc ∈ [λ ,λ ]. Let t ∈ R be the time of update
of the decentralized learning algorithm. Let λ jc j(t) be the flow of messages sent by
player j at time t. Let ε ∈ R+ be the perturbation parameter.
dλ jc j(t)
dt
=


1
J ∑i
λici(t)−λ jc j(t)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Imitation
+ε
∂U j
∂λ j
(λ jc j(t),λ− j(t))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
gradient


λ
λ
(2.15)
=
[
1
J ∑i
λici(t)−λ jc j(t)+ ε
(
γ∗j ∑i6= j λici(t)
(∑i λici(t))
2 − γ0
)]λ
λ
(2.16)
(2.17)
Theorem 2.10. Consider that (H1) and (H2) are satisfied. Then ∀ε << 1
λ jc j(t) →t→+∞
λ ∗jc j ∀ j (2.18)
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of λ1c1(t) and λ2c2(t).
Table 2.2: Main notations used throughout section 2.6
Symbol Meaning
J number of sources
L number of news feeds
N jl stationary point process that counts the number of messages posted by
j in news feed l
λ jl intensity of the stationary point process N
l
j; λ j := (λ
1
j , . . . ,λ
L
j )
λ jl ∈ [0,λ ], with λ < ∞
P sharing matrix where the ll′-entry is denoted by pll′
γ0 linear cost
where λ ∗jc j =
1
J ∑i
λ ∗ici and ∑
i
λ ∗ici =
Γ
(J−1)
where Γ := γ0 ∑
i
1
γ∗i
. Moreover if for each
j and i, γ∗j = γ
∗
i , then λ
∗
jc j = λ
NE
jc j .
In fig. 2.1 we illustrate the convergence of (2.15) with two symmetric players and
two News Feeds. We impose ε = 0.1, γ∗1 = γ
∗
2 = 1 and γ0 = 0.1. As expected, we can
observe that the trajectories of λ1c1 and λ2c2 follow quickly the same behaviour and then
we can see the convergence of the whole system.
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2.6 Network extension
The main symbols used in this section are reported in Tab. 2.2. We consider a general-
ization of our model to take into account the propagation effect between several news
feeds. In fact, some messages posted on one news feed can be relayed (propagated) to
another news feed. We assume that posting a message on a news feed has a cost for the
source, whereas if a message is relayed, it is free for the source. In this section, we study
this topological effect on the non-cooperative game between the sources. The described
scenario is illustrated in fig. 2.2.
We assume that there are L news feed and l ∈ {1, . . . ,L} denotes a news feed index.
Each source j ∈ {1, . . . ,J} can send messages to each news feed l. It means that each
source j controls L point processes, which represent flow of messages of source j in
each news feed, with intensity λ jl = E[N jl((0,1])]. We assume that λ jl ∈ [0,λ ] for
each j and l. For each news feed l, any new message is copied and posted, with a
probability pll′ , to the other news feed l
′ 6= l. This process defines, for each source j,
a new point process in each news feed l with intensity X jl which is the solution of the
following linear system:
X jl = λ jl +
L
∑
l′=1, l′ 6=l
pl′lX jl′ , ∀ j, l. (2.19)
We denote X j = (X j1, . . . ,X jL) for each j. For each l, we assume that
L
∑
l′=1, l′ 6=l
pll′ < 1.
By applying similar analysis as in section 2.3, we obtain the following closed-form
expression of the probability that when a message arrives in news feed l, it is coming
from source j:
lim
h→0
P(Zl(T+(t)) = j | N(t, t + h] ≥ 1) =
X jl
∑i Xil
. (2.20)
Let γ0 be the cost associated with source j for sending one message to news feed l.
We denote the flow vector of source j by λ j = {λ j1, . . . ,λ jL}. The objective function of
each source j is:
U j(λ j,λ− j) = ∑
l
X jl
∑i Xil
− γ0 ∑
l
λ jl , (2.21)
where for each j and l, X jl is solution of:
X jl = λ jl +
L
∑
l′=1, l′ 6=l
pl′lX jl′ , ∀ j, l. (2.22)
This game is a symmetric game and we define XNEl := X
NE
jl the symmetric equilibrium
for each source j and each news feed l.
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 Sources Users’ new feed 
Figure 2.2: Sources sending messages to different news feeds.
Proposition 2.11. Consider that there exists a Nash equilibrium such that for each j
and l,
J−1
J2
[
1
γ0(1−∑l′ 6=l pll′)
−∑
l′
pl′l
γ0(1−∑l′′ 6=l′ pl′l′′)
]
∈ (0,λ ),
then
λ NEjl =
J−1
J2
[
1
γ0(1−∑l′ 6=l pll′)
−∑
l′
pl′l
γ0(1−∑l′′ 6=l′ pl′l′′)
]
. (2.23)
Moreover
U j(λ
NE
j ,λ
NE
− j ) =
L
J2
. (2.24)
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have defined a routing game where sources have to decide how
many messages they have to post and the topic of their messages. Nash equilibrium
uniqueness, an explicit form and a characterization via concave programming is
provided. Also a decentralized algorithm that converges to the NE was proposed.
Finally, we extend our work to multiple news feeds, where the sharing phenomenon is
modeled.
APPENDIX
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Proof of proposition 2.1
Consider j ∈ {1, . . . ,J} and t ∈ R then,
P0N(Z(0) = j) = lim
h→0
P(Z(T+(t)) = j | N(t, t + h] ≥ 1)
where P0N(Z(0) = j) =
1
λ (b−a)
E
[
∑
n∈Z
1Zn= j1Tn∈(a,b]
]
. P0N is called the Palm proba-
bility of the marks Zn. The first equality comes from the local interpretation of Palm
probability (p.40 [45]). From the definition of the intensity of Ni, it is possible to write:
λ j(b−a) = E
[
∑
n∈Z
1Zn= j1Tn∈(a,b]
]
= λ (b−a)P0N(Z(0) = j).
The first equality comes from the definition of the intensity of N j and the second equality
comes from the definition of P0N(Z(0) = j). From the definition of N j we have λ =∑
i
λi.
Then,
P0N(Z(0) = j) =
λ j
∑i λi
.
Proof of proposition 2.3
If all sources {1, · · · ,J}− { j} play 0, j can always find a very small λ NEjc such that
λ NEj <
γ jc
γ0
. Then, we have that U j(λ
NE
j ,0) > 0 and the decision vector (0, . . . ,0) is not
a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 2.4
Let j ∈ {1, . . . ,J} be a fixed source. We assume the existence of (c,c′) ∈ {1, . . . ,C}2
such that λ NEjc′ > 0, λ
NE
jc > 0. Then λ
NE
jc′ and λ
NE
jc are solution of the first order necessary
condition: 


U j
∂λ jc′
(λ NEj ,λ
NE
− j ) = 0
U j
∂λ jc
(λ NEj ,λ
NE
− j ) = 0
(2.25)
⇔



γ jc′
∑i ∑c′′ λ
NE
ic′′
−
∑c′′ γ jc′′ ∑c′′ λ
NE
jc′′
(∑i ∑c′′ λ
NE
ic′′ )
2
− γ0 = 0
γ jc
∑i ∑c′′ λ
NE
ic′′
−
∑c′′ γ jc′′ ∑c′′ λ
NE
jc′′
(∑i ∑c′′ λ
NE
ic′′ )
2
− γ0 = 0
(2.26)
⇔
γ jc′
∑i ∑c′′ λ
NE
ic′′
−
∑c′′ γ jc′′ ∑c′′ λ
NE
jc′′
(∑i ∑c′′ λ
NE
ic′′ )
2
− γ0 =
γ jc
∑i ∑c′′ λ
NE
ic′′
−
∑c′′ γ jc′′ ∑c′′ λ
NE
jc′′
(∑i ∑c′′ λ
NE
ic′′ )
2
− γ0, (2.27)
implies γ jc = γ jc′ which contradicts γ jc > γ jc′ . So by contradiction the proposition
follows.
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Proof of theorem 2.6
From the sufficient optimality condition and from the fact that for all j, λ > λ NEjc j > 0,
λ NEjc j is solution of [
1
∑i λ
NE
ici
−
λ NEjc j
(∑i λ
NE
ici
)2
]
−
γ0
γ∗j
= 0, ∀ j. (2.28)
Then by taking the sum over j in (2.28) and by defining Λ = ∑
i
λici and Γ = ∑
i
γ0
γ∗i
we
get:
J−1
ΛNE
−Γ = 0, (2.29)
which are the KKT condition of (2.11).
Proof of theorem 2.7
From the first order optimality condition and from the fact that for all j, λ NEjc j > 0, we
can deduce that for all j
λ NEjc j = ∑
i
λ NEici −
γ0
γ∗j
(∑
i
λ NEici )
2. (2.30)
Thus, we observe that λ NEjc j is uniquely defined by ∑
i
λ NEici for each j. Moreover,
because of the theorem 2.6, ∑
i
λ NEici is unique and so is λ
NE
jc j .
Proof of proposition 2.8
From the first order optimality condition and from the fact that for all j, λ NEjc j > 0, we
deduce, for all j
λ NEjc j = ∑
i
λ NEici −
γ0
γ∗j
(∑
i
λ NEici )
2. (2.31)
By taking the sum over j in (2.31) we get:
∑
i
λ NEici = J ∑
i
λ NEici − (∑
i
γ0
γ∗i
)(∑
i
λ NEici )
2 (2.32)
1 = J− (∑
i
γ0
γ∗i
)(∑
i
λ NEici ) (2.33)
∑
i
λ NEici = (J−1)
1
(∑i
γ0
γ∗i
)
. (2.34)
The rest of the proof follows from equation (2.31).
Proof of theorem 2.10
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First when ε → 0, we can consider for all j, λ jc j(t) is solution of
λ̇ jc j(t) =
[
1
J ∑i
λici(t)−λ jc j(t)
]λ
λ
. (2.35)
We are in the case of cooperative ode [46] and then for all j the unique globally attractive
rest point of this system is:
0 = [
1
J ∑i
λici −λ jc j ]
λ
λ =
1
J ∑i
λici −λ jc j , ∀i, λici ∈ [λ ,λ ]. (2.36)
The previous equation implies for all j and l,
λ̇ jc j(t) =
[
1
∑i λici(t)
−
∑i λici(t)
J(∑i λici(t))
2 −
γ0
γ∗j
]λ
λ
(2.37)
=
[
J−1
J ∑i λici(t)
−
γ0
γ∗j
]λ
λ
(2.38)
It can be notice that (2.37) only depends of ∑
i
λici(t). By taking the sum over i in (2.37)
we obtain that ∑
i
λici(t) is solution of
∑
i
λ̇ici(t) =
[
J−1
∑i λici(t)
−∑
i
γ0
γ∗i
]λ
λ
. (2.39)
(2.39) converges to the ∑
i
λ NEici . Indeed, (2.11) can be taken as a Lyapunov function for
(2.39) and by using the Lasalle principle the convergence can be proved (p.118, [46]).
From (2.36) we can conclude that:
lim
t→∞
λ jc j(t) = limt→∞
1
J ∑i
λici(t). (2.40)
Proof of proposition 2.11
The objective of a source j is given by;
max
λ j∈[0,λ ]L
L
∑
l=1
X jl
∑i Xil
− γ0
L
∑
l=1
λ jl , (2.41)
where for all l, X jl is solution of the following linear system:
X jl = λ jl + ∑
l′ 6=l
pl′lX jl′ . (2.42)
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The following linear system as a unique solution due to the fact that the matrix P is
substochastic. Therefore, we can deduce that this game is equivalent to the game where
the objective of a source j is given by:
max
λ j∈[0,λ ]L, X j
U(λ j,λ− j,X j,X− j) :=
L
∑
l=1
X jl
∑i Xil
− γ0
L
∑
l=1
λ jl , (2.43)
subject to:
X jl = λ jl + ∑
l′ 6=l
pl′lX jl′ , ∀l, (2.44)
where X j := (X j1, . . . ,X jL) and X− j := (X1, . . . ,X j−1,X j+1, . . . ,XJ). We define the la-
grangian function:
L j(λ j,X j,α j) =
L
∑
l=1
X jl
∑i Xil
− γ0
L
∑
l=1
λ jl +
L
∑
l=1
α jl(X jl −λ jl − ∑
l′ 6=l
pl′lX jl), (2.45)
with α j := (α j1, . . . ,α jL). By assuming that λ
NE
j > 0 and X
NE
j > 0 for all j, the first
order optimality condition implies that:



∂L j
∂λ jl
(λ NEj ,X
NE
j ,α
NE
j ) = 0
∂L j
∂X jl
(λ NEj ,X
NE
j ,α
NE
j ) = 0
(2.46)
⇔



−γ0 = α jl
1
∑i X
NE
il
−
X jl
(∑i X
NE
il )
2
+α jl − ∑
l′ 6=l
α jl′ pll′ = 0
(2.47)
⇔



−γ0 = α jl
1
∑i X
NE
il
−
X jl
(∑i X
NE
il )
2
= γ0(1− ∑
l′ 6=l
pll′)
(2.48)
symmetric Nash
⇔



−γ0 = α jl
1
JXNEl
−
XNEl
(JXNEl )
2
= γ0(1− ∑
l′ 6=l
pll′)
(2.49)
⇔



−γ0 = α jl
XNEl =
J−1
J2γ0(1−∑l′ 6=l pll′)
. (2.50)
According to (2.19), we can deduce that for each l and l′:
λ NEjl = X
NE
l −∑
l′
pl′lX
NE
l′ (2.51)
=
J−1
J2
[
1
γ0(1−∑l′ 6=l pll′)
−∑
l′
pl′l
1
γ0(1−∑l′′ 6=l′ pl′l′′)
]
. (2.52)
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Moreover,
U j(λ
NE
j ,λ
NE
− j ) =
L
∑
l=1
XNEjl
∑i X
NE
il
− γ0
L
∑
l=1
λ NEjl (2.53)
=
L
∑
l=1
XNEl
JXNEl
− γ0
L
∑
l=1
(XNEl − ∑
l′ 6=l
pl′lX
NE
l′ ) (2.54)
=
L
J
− γ0
L
∑
l=1
XNEl (1− ∑
l′ 6=l
pll′) (2.55)
=
L
J
− γ0
L
∑
l=1
J−1
J2γ0(1−∑l′ 6=l pll′)
(1− ∑
l′ 6=l
pll′) (2.56)
=
L
J
−
L(J−1)
J2
(2.57)
=
L
J2
. (2.58)
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Chapter 3. Posting Behavior Dynamics in OSN
This chapter is based on the paper Posting behavior in Online Social Networks and
Content Active Filtering.
3.1 Introduction
Nowadays, OSNs (like Facebook or Twitter) have allowed a large population of users
to post contents about different topics and to express different opinions. And with this
amazing opportunity comes new problematic: When do users post in OSNs? Why do
they decide to post on a particular content? etc. Some works in Sociological Science try
to find an answer to these questions [68] and [69].
The first goal of this chapter is to model the posting behaviour of users, also called
sources. In our model, users with some particular content, connect to the OSN accord-
ing to a Poisson Process. Following [68], we assume that there is some self-censorship
exercised by the user: only contents that he estimates to be potentially popular1 will be
posted. To the best of our knowledge, mathematical models for posting behaviour do
not involve popularity of contents [69], [70; 68]. We also consider possible externali-
ties between different contents, i.e., the number of contents from source c impacts the
popularity of a content from any other sources including source c. Externalities may
occur, for example, when content consumers have a limited budget of attention [15]. In
this case, negative externalities occur, meaning that the larger the number of contents is,
lower is the popularity of other content. Other typical scenarios are described in the in-
troduction of [12]. In previous works, the posting behaviour of a source in an OSN was
modelled using three main factors: trends, interest of the source and of its neighbours
[70]. We introduce a model based on stochastic approximations [46] in order to study
the evolution of the amount of posted contents by various sources taking into account
the externalities impact. Sufficient conditions are provided to ensure its convergence to
a unique rest point. A close-form of this rest point is given and we show that it can be
obtained as the unique equilibrium of a non-cooperative game.
The second goal of this chapter is to propose content active filtering in order to
increase content diversity at the rest point of the posting behaviour dynamics. Content
Active Filtering (CAF) are actions taken by the administrator of the OSN in order to
promote some objectives related to the quantity of contents posted from various sources.
There are many ways to implement CAF in practice. For example, when user posts
some content in Facebook, the administrator can decide on which wall the content will
appear and who will be notified on this post [71]. As objective of the CAF we shall
consider maximizing the diversity of posted contents for the following reasons. We find
it desirable that OSNs provide an access to content of different sources in a diverse
way. We call this property content diversity. Such diversity is critical in Political News
[72] and [73]. Websites Initiatives (like politifact.com or FactCheck.org)
1Standard measures of popularity are the number of likes, views, comments, shares, etc...
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that try to introduce the same visibility to different opinions. Another context where
content diversity is an important issue is Health Information [74; 75]. In these papers,
the authors show that high quality Health information is not easily accessible. If we
consider that we are not able to measure the quality of information, a simple solution
to solve this quality/accessibility trade-off is to increase diversity between contents. A
similar issue arises when we are interested in decreasing misinformation propagation
and gossip in OSNs, [76], [6] and [36].
Organization of the chapter. After a short state-of-the-art section, we motivate the
externalities effect by studying data extracted from an OSN in section 3.3. Then, in sec-
tion 3.4, we introduce the posting behaviour model which includes the externalities. We
formulate the limit regime for appropriate scaling obtained through stochastic approxi-
mations. In section 3.4.2, sufficient conditions are provided to ensure the convergence
of the stochastic approximation to a unique rest point, and we provide a closed-form
expression of this rest point. In section 3.5, we define content diversity and we propose
a Content Active Filtering (CAF) with a closed-form. Numerical simulations of posting
behaviour convergence are proposed in section 3.6. We also illustrate the usefulness
of the CAF mechanism in a realistic scenario and we demonstrate how real data can
be used to estimate the influence matrix considering a reverse engineering viewpoint.
Finally, in section 3.7 we give some conclusions and perspectives of the chapter.
3.2 Related works
Many recent works study empirically the behaviour of users in OSNs, for example [29]
and [33]. In [29], empirical analysises are proposed to study the connectivity properties
and user activity on different OSNs, in particular on Facebook, Twitter and Google+.
The authors notice that on Facebook and Google+, there are more creation of messages
than reshares (to relay a received post), and that the opposite scenario occurs on Twitter.
In [33], the authors consider a temporal context-aware mixture model to describe the
behaviour of users. They assume that contents of interest for each user are related to
their own intrinsic interest and a global temporal context. The authors show, considering
an OSN dataset, that their model is more realistic than other models from the literature.
The question of visibility and popularity of contents in OSNs have recently been
subjects of interest from a theoretical point of view. For example, in [53] the authors
consider a dynamical model to describe the popularity of various contents in Youtube.
Each source can increase the popularity of its content in Youtube to get views by paying
a cost for advertisement. The authors provide an exact optimal policy of investment for
sources. In [77], the authors propose a model in which several sources maximize their
visibility in a News Feed. This work assumes that the more a message stays on the top
first messages of a News Feed, the more its popularity increases. The goal of this work
is to understand how to model the dynamics of message visibility and to understand the
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consequences of a competition over visibility between different sources.
Negative externalities are well-known phenomena in diffusion process [78] and [79].
The model proposed in [78] describes a situation in which several users of an OSN have
to decide to adopt one technology among several. In a marketing context, companies, by
using targeting strategies, decide which users receive ads and therefore optimize their
profit. In this paper, the authors provide a mathematical framework in a competition
scenario between several companies. In [79], the authors discuss seeding competition,
where firms need to decide which users will be the first to be contaminated. The goal
of this paper is to provide solutions of the seeding competition and also to quantify the
inefficiency of the competition over firms.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical works related to content di-
versity improvement in OSNs. In social sciences, there exist some studies that try to
design tools in order to increase diversity in political opinions [80] or to improve civil
discourses [81]. In [80] the authors use a widget2 that shows to users their reading
diversity. A search engine algorithm is proposed in [80] to increase content diversity.
3.3 Popularity Analysis based on a Case Study
In this section, we present an empirical study of the posting behaviour of 3 French news
companies over an OSN. Particularly, we study the correlation between the proportion
of messages from different source (news company) and the average popularity of the
messages. Therefore we first demonstrate the relationship between the popularity of
messages from one source with respect to the posting rates of the other sources. Second,
we observe that this relationship implies negative or positive externalities.
Our dataset is composed of messages posted on three Facebook pages (Le monde,
Liberation, Le Figaro). We extract in total 52376 messages posted using the Netvizz
app [19]. The data was collected from January 01 2010 to June 06 2015. Each message
is associated with the source , the timestamp and the number of "like".
The popularity of each message is measured as a function of the number of "like"
associated with it. On figure 3.1, each point represents the average popularity of all
messages published ruling a specific day from one news company, with respect to the
posting rate of another news company.
As we observe in the scatter plots, there is a correlation which can be positive or
negative between the average popularity and the posting rates. For instance, in fig. 1(a),
the posting rate of Le Monde impacts positively the average popularity of messages
posted by Liberation. However, not only positive effects are observed as it can be no-
ticed in fig. 1(b). In this case, there is a negative relationship between the posting rate of
2http://balancestudy.org/
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Figure 3.1: Popularity impact over the posting strategy
Le Figaro and the average popularity of Le Monde’s messages. The correlation matrix
between the 3 news companies, also called sources, is provided below:


0.2564758 −0.08708539 −0.167834
0.2359287 −0.2455585 −0.01392799
0.3441988 −0.09750635 −0.2416787

 . (3.1)
We then demonstrate that both positive and negative correlations are possible between
the popularity of messages and the posting rates of sources. In the next section, we
develop the evolution of the posting behaviour of a source, taking into account the cor-
relation between the popularity of messages and the posting rates. This externality effect
is captured through an influence matrix.
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Table 3.1: Main notations used throughout the chapter 3
Symbol Meaning
C number of sources
tn arrival instant of the n
th content
Zc(n) potential level of popularity
λc arrival rate of contents from source c
ξ (n) source of content n
yc(n) total number of posts from c; xc(n) :=
yc(n)
n
x(n) = (x1(n), . . . ,xC(n)), x(0) = x0
A+ (A−) the positive (resp. the negative) impacts or externalities matrix be-
tween sources
θc popularity threshold associated with source c
pc probability that the content from source c is accepted in the OSN
p := (p1, . . . , pC)
3.4 Evolution of the posting behaviour
Based on the observations made in the previous section, we propose a model of the
evolution of the posted messages fraction associated with each source when they are
sensitive to popularity. We try to answer the following questions:
• Can we expect a convergence of the posting behaviour over time?
• If the convergence occurs, can we have a closed-form of the limit?
We provide positive answers to these questions. The main symbols used in the chapter
are reported in Tab. 3.1.
3.4.1 Model
We consider that sources generate new content and then sources decide to post it or
not depending on the potential popularity of the content. More precisely, we denote by
tn ∈ R+ the arrival instant of the n
th content. For example, in newspapers or the area
of business of News, several sources like Associated Press or reporters generate new
contents and send these to the sources, which could be interested in its and therefore
may want to publish its. A source may also be any user of an OSN. Each content
has a potential level of popularity Zc(n) ∈ R+. For any source c, the arrival rate of
contents is an independent Poisson point process with intensity λc ∈ R+. Let ξ (n) ∈ C
be the random variable that determines the source associated with the nth content. The
probability that the nth opportunity concerns the source c is given by [82]:
P(ξ (n) = c) =
λc
∑c′ λc′
.
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For any source c, let yc(n) be the total number of posts of source c in the OSN during
[0, tn]. For each source c, let xc(n) :=
yc(n)
n
be the average number of posts from c.
Note that, by definition, we have for all source c and arrival instant tn, xc(n) ∈ [0,1]. We
denote the vector x(n) = (x1(n), . . . ,xC(n)). The scalar product of two vectors x and y
is denoted by < x,y >. The transpose of a matrix A is denoted AT .
Popularity and decision to post. We assume that a source will decide to post a new
content if the potential level of popularity of his content (i.e. number of likes, comments,
etc.) exceeds a threshold θc ∈ R+. We assume that each source has enough experience
to predict the popularity of his content. The random variables Zc(n) are independent.
The probability that the source c will posts his content is given by, for each n:
P(Zc(n) ≥ θc | ξ (n) = c,x(n)) :=
1
2 ∑c′
a−cc′(1− xc′(n))+
1
2 ∑c′
a+cc′xc′(n),
where the matrix A+ := {a+cc′}cc′ and A
− := {a−cc′}cc′ describe, respectively, the positive
(resp. the negative) impacts or externalities between sources. These two matrices are
assumed to be substochastic. The difference a+cc − a
−
cc gives the global influence of c
′
over c. For example if a+cc − a
−
cc is positive then source c
′ has a positive influence over
source c.
Note that for any source c, the popularity distribution of Zc(n) depends on the aver-
age number of posts of each content so far. This type of dependence has been proposed
in [12]. Then the probability that the nth content is posted by c is given by:
P(Zc(n) ≥ θc,ξ (n) = c | x(n)) = P(ξ (n) = c)×P(Zc(n) ≥ θc | ξ (n) = c,x(n))
=
λc
∑c′ λc′
[
1
2 ∑c′
a−cc′(1− xc′(n))+
1
2 ∑c′
a+cc′xc′(n)
]
.
The linearity property is similar to the one proposed in [12]. The authors consider a
linear relation between the probability for user to get some content knowing the previous
contents he received. The advantage of using linear function is that we can have matrix
representation of the externality between contents. Moreover, this probability function
can be fit by using the maximum likelihood as in [12].
The posting probability function P(Zc(n) ≥ θc,ξ (n) = c | x(n)) considered here,
can be related to demand functions in Cournot competition [83] or delay function in
routing games [49]. In fact, in an economic framework, the inverse linear demand is a
classical assumption [83] and [84]. It is also the case in network economic models [85].
Example from case study. In fig. 3.2 is depicted information flows in a News
Business taking from the case study described in section 3.3. Different creators of
contents generate contents, some of them are exclusive to sources and some of them
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Social Networks 
 
Creators of contents 
  Sources 
 
Posted 
 Not Posted 
 
Figure 3.2: Information flows in News business
are common creators of contents like AP and AFP. Sources, which are famous News
French companies (Le Monde, Liberation and Le Figaro) decide to post or not their
incoming content on OSNs like Facebook, Tweeter, etc.
3.4.2 Rest point analysis
We first study the asymptotic behaviour of x(n). We provide an assumption such that
it exists a unique x∗ where lim
n→∞
x(n) = x∗. For each source c, the evolution of the total
number of posts yc is described by:
yc(n+ 1) = yc(n)+ ζc(n),
where the update of the number of content c posts ζc(n), is given by:
ζc(n) :=
{
1 w.p P(Zc(n) ≥ θc,ξ (n) = c | x(n)),
0 w.p 1−P(Zc(n) ≥ θc,ξ (n) = c | x(n)).
(3.2)
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Moreover, according to the previous equation, for each source c, the evolution of the
average posts xc(n) is described by the following stochastic approximation equation:
xc(n+ 1) = xc(n)+
1
n+ 1
(ζc(n)− xc(n)) . (3.3)
The posting rates vector x∗ is called the rest point associated with (3.3). Intuitively,
equation(3.3) can be seen as a finite difference Euler scheme of the following system of
differential equations:
ẋc(t) = P(Zc(t) ≥ θc,ξ (t) = c | x(t))− xc(t), xc(0) = x0c . (3.4)
However, equation (3.3) is a stochastic difference equation, which is not the case for the
classical Euler scheme. The theory of stochastic approximations [46] links the asymp-
totic behaviour of x(n) and x(t). We study these dynamics by introducing the following
matrix B = (Bcc′) and vector D as:
∀c,c′, Bcc′ =
λc
2∑c′′ λc′′
(a+cc′ −a
−
cc′)−1c=c′ , (3.5)
(with 1c=c′ = 1 if c = c
′ otherwise it is 0) and
D =
[
λ1
2∑c′ λc′
∑
c′
a−1c′ , . . . ,
λC
2∑c′ λc′
∑
c′
a−Cc′
]
. (3.6)
To ensure the convergence of the stochastic process, we consider the following
assumption.
Assumption 1: The matrix
A+−A−
4
+
(A+−A−)T
4
is assumed to be negative definite.
Under this assumption, we show in the next proposition the convergence of the
dynamical process x(n) to the unique rest point x∗.
Proposition 3.1. We assume that assumption 1 holds. The sequence {x(n)} converges
almost surely to x∗ with
∀c, x∗c = −
1
2∑c′′ λc′′
∑
c′
[B−1]cc′λc′ ∑
c′
a−cc′ .
The vector x∗ is the unique positive solution of:
Bx∗+D = 0. (3.7)
In the next section, we illustrate our framework by showing that the rest point x∗
is equivalent to a stable strategic situation (particularly a Nash Equilibrium) of a non-
cooperative game between the subscribers in which each one tries to maximize his pop-
ularity by posting the contents.
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3.4.3 A game theoretic perspective
In this section we demonstrate that the steady state of the posting behaviour dynamics
studied in previous sections can be obtained by assuming a posting competition be-
tween the sources. Particularly, we show that the rest point x∗ obtained in proposition
3.1 is a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game in which each source strategically
determines his posting rate in order to maximize the popularity of his own messages.
We also propose a decentralized algorithm that computes the Nash equilibrium. Game
theory yields a natural framework to study such competitive setting and the Nash equi-
librium is an ideal situation in the sense that no source has an interest to deviate from
the equilibrium. Then, in other words, the rest point of the dynamical system described
in 3.3 is strategically stable.
Each source c controls his posting rate xc, which denotes the amount of contents
posted by the source c per unit of time (we call it also the posting rate) in the OSN. We
assume that the average popularity of a content posted by source c is a function of the
posting rates vector x of all sources. sources are interested in maximizing the cumulative
popularity of their contents minus a cost for sending contents. In fact, sending contents
is not free, as content has to be generated or obtained trough economic trades. The
utility function of source c is given by:
Uc(xc,x−c) = xc
λc
∑c′ λc′
(
1
2 ∑c′ 6=c
a+cc′xc′ +
a+cc
4
xc +
1
2 ∑c′ 6=c
a−cc′(1− xc′)+
a−cc
4
(1− xc))−
1
2
(xc)
2,
where x−c = [x1, . . . ,xc−1,xc+1, . . . ,xC]. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) x
NE is a specific
vector of posting rates defined as follows.
Definition 3.2. A vector xNE ∈ R+ is a Nash Equilibrium if for all source c,
xNEc ∈ arg max
xc≥0
Uc(xc,xNE−c ). (3.8)
In the following analysis of the Nash Equilibrium of the non-cooperative game, we
assume first the existence of an interior Nash Equilibrium. This assumption is well
known in similar types of games which are routing games [49].
Asumption 2: It exists a vector of posting rates xNE that satisfies equation (3.8)
and such that for each source c, xNEc > 0.
Definition 3.3. For each c, the noisy best response of source c against x−c is given by:
xNEc ∈ arg max
xc≥0
Uc(xc,xNE−c + ε−c), (3.9)
where each component of ε−c ∈ R
c is a zero mean gaussian noise with finite variance.
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In particular, it is possible to compute a closed-form expression of the best response
function as:
0 =
∂Uc
∂xc
(xc,x−c + ε−c)
=
λc
∑c′ λc′
(
∑
c′
a+cc′xc′ +∑
c′
a−cc′(1− xc′)
)
− xc +
λc
∑c′ λc′
∑
c′
(a+cc′ −a
−
cc′)εc′
⇔
(
∑c′ λc′ +λc(a
−
cc −a
+
cc)
∑c′ λc′
)
xc =
λc
∑c′ λc′
(
∑
c′ 6=c
a+cc′xc′ + ∑
c′ 6=c
a−cc′(1− xc′)+ a
−
cc
)
+
λc
∑c′ λc′
∑
c′
(a+cc′ −a
−
cc′)εc′
⇔ xc =
λc
(∑c′ λc′ +(a
+
cc −a
−
cc)λc)
(
∑
c′ 6=c
a+cc′xc′ + ∑
c′ 6=c
a−cc′(1− xc′)+ a
−
cc
)
+
λc
(∑c′ λc′ +(a
+
cc −a
−
cc)λc)
∑
c′
(a+cc′ −a
−
cc′)εc′ . (3.10)
The previous relationship between xc and x−c provides an algorithmic way to com-
pute the Nash equilibrium. Indeed, a decentralized algorithm that computes iteratively
the best response of each source against the actions of the other players, converges
to the Nash equilibrium. We next describe this algorithm called the Best-response
algorithm, where x(t) is the posting rates vector of the sources at time slot t:
Best-response algorithm [86]
Initialization: x(1) is randomly chosen in [0,1]C.
For each round t = 1,2, . . .
1. Each source observes a noisy version of x−c(t), i.e x̃−c(t) = x−c(t)+ ε(t)
where for each c, εc(t) is a zero mean gaussian noise.
2. Then each source updates his decision by computing his best response:
xc(t + 1) = argmaxxc∈[0,1]Uc(xc, x̃−c(t)) =
λc
(∑c′ λc′ +(a
+
cc −a
−
cc)λc)
(
∑
c′ 6=c
a+cc′xc′(t)+ ∑
c′ 6=c
a−cc′(1− xc′(t))+ a
−
cc
)
+
λc
(∑c′ λc′ +(a
+
cc −a
−
cc)λc)
∑
c′
(a+cc′ −a
−
cc′)εc′(t).
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3. Stop when max
c
| xc(t + 1)− xc(t) |< δ for δ << 1 otherwise go to step 1.
We illustrate the convergence of the best response algorithm in the numerical
section 3.6. Finally, in the next proposition, we prove the equivalence between x∗,
the rest point of (3.4), and a vector xNE which is an interior Nash equilibrium of the
non-cooperative popularity game between sources.
Proposition 3.4. We assume that Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold. x∗ ∈ [0,1]C is
a rest point of (3.4) iff xNE ∈ [0,1]C is Nash Equilibrium of the previous game.
Based on this result, in the next section we describe a control mechanism, which
aims to reach a diverse content flow in this dynamical system at the stationary regime,
equivalently at the Nash Equilibrium point.
3.5 Content diversity
The second goal of this chapter is to increase the diversity of contents in an OSN. We
are looking for contents that are posted by different sources. Note that even if the
same content, provided by a common source, is posted by two different sources, their
posted messages will not be necessary exactly identical and then perceived differently
by the OSN consumers. In this section, we first define the diversity of contents in an
OSN in terms of a relationship between the average numbers of posts of all the sources.
Then, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition such that the rest point x∗ satisfies
this diversity property. Using a content active filtering (CAF) approach, we provide a
closed-form optimal control of the posting rates that ensure this diversity property.
3.5.1 Diversity analysis
The diversity of contents published in an OSN is highly related to equal proportion of
contents such that subscribers have access to all contents from different sources in an
equal way. We then define the diversity property of source rate vector x ∈ RC.
Definition 3.5. Let x ∈ RC be a vector of the average number of posts associated with
each source in an OSN. We say that x satisfies the diversity property if for all (c,c′)∈C ,
we have:
xc = xc′ . (3.11)
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Note that our definition of content diversity is related to the posting rates of the
sources and not to the content itself. In fact, messages published by different sources
may mention the same content, but these contents are coming from different sources
or are exposed differently by the sources. We therefore talk about content diversity in
order to specify that the messages posted on the OSN come from different sources. The
next proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the rest point x∗ to
satisfy the diversity property given by equation (3.11).
Proposition 3.6. The rest point x∗ ∈ [0,1]C satisfies the diversity property if and only
if: ∀(c,c′′) ∈ C 2
λc ∑c′ a
−
cc′
λc ∑c′(a
−
cc′ −a
+
cc′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
=
λc′′ ∑c′ a
−
c′′c′
λc′′ ∑c′(a
−
c′′c′ −a
+
c′′c′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
.
Several measures of diversity are already proposed in different scientific fields. But
the most well-known are the Gini index, defined in [87], and the Shannon entropy,
defined in [88]. Usually, a diversity measure is defined as a function D : RC → R
satisfying the following property:
xE = argmax
x
D(x) iff xEc = x
E
c′ , ∀(c,c
′) ∈ C . (3.12)
In this chapter, we look for a diversity property and not a measure of the level of
diversity in an OSN. We study, in the next section, how to control the posting behaviour
such that the rest point of the posts dynamics satisfy this diversity property.
3.5.2 Increase diversity: a content active filtering approach
What kind of control can be used to increase diversity in an OSN? We answer this
question by proposing a content active filtering (CAF) approach. For each news arrival
n, if the message is posted, the OSN may accept or not the message. Therefore the OSN
may refuse to relay some messages. We consider a source type control and we denote
by p = [p1, . . . , pC] the control vector. The element pc ∈ [0,1] represents the probability
that the content from source c is accepted, and therefore posted on the OSN. We assume
that each source knows the OSN CAF policy p. Considering a given CAF p, for the
source c the probability that a new arrival message is posted is then given by:
P(Zc(n) ≥ θc | ξ (n) = c, pc,x(n)) = pc(
1
2 ∑c′
a+cc′xc′(n)+
1
2 ∑c′
a−cc′(1− xc′(n))).
Thus for each c, the evolution of xc(n) is described by the following stochastic approx-
imation:
xc(n+ 1) = xc(n)+
1
n+ 1
(
ζ 1c (n)− xc(n)
)
, (3.13)
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where the update of the number of content c posts ζ 1c (n), is given by:
ζ 1c (n) :=



1 w.p
λc
∑c′ λc′
P(Zc(n) ≥ θc | ξ (n) = c, pc,x(n)),
0 w.p 1−
λc
∑c′ λc′
P(Zc(n) ≥ θc | ξ (n) = c, pc,x(n)).
(3.14)
The rest point x∗ of (3.13), according to theorem 3.1, is solution of the following system:
x∗c = pc
λc
∑c′ λc′
[
1
2 ∑c′
a+cc′x
∗
c′ +
1
2 ∑c′
a−cc′x
∗
c′
]
, ∀c ∈ C . (3.15)
We observe that the stationary posting rates vector x∗ is solution of a system which
is linear with respect to the CAF vector p. The OSN determines a CAF p∗ with two
objectives in mind:
1. Determine p∗ ∈ [0,1]C such that if x ∈ [0,1]C is the unique rest point of (3.13)
then x ∈ [0,1]C (rest point of the dynamics) satisfies (3.11) (the stationary regime
of the average number of posts satisfies the diversity property).
2. Find p∗ ∈ [0,1]C such that the dynamical system given by equation (3.13) con-
verges to x∗.
The next theorem provides a characterization of a CAF p∗ that satisfies the previous
properties.
Proposition 3.7. We assume that assumption 1 hold and we define:
Y = min
c
(
λc ∑c′ a
−
cc′
λc ∑c′(a
−
cc′ −a
+
cc′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
)
, (3.16)
c∗ = argmin
c
(
λc ∑c′ a
−
cc′
λc ∑c′(a
−
cc′ −a
+
cc′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
)
. (3.17)
Then the CAF p∗ defined by:
pc∗ = 1 (3.18)
pc =
2Y ∑c′ λc′
λc(∑c′ a
−
cc′ −Y (∑c′ a
−
cc′ −a
+
cc′))
, ∀c 6= c∗, (3.19)
satifies the following properties:
1. the unique rest point x∗ ∈ [0,1]C of (3.13) satisfies the diversity property (3.11),
2. and the dynamical system given by equation (3.13) converges to x∗.
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A CAF is a simple control mechanism that can be used by an OSN to control the
contents posted by the sources. CAFs already exist in various forms in OSN, in order
to limit the amount of received information by each user. For instance in Facebook,
filtering occurs by limiting the amount of messages that are send to user’s news feed
when a friend of him posts messages. A CAF is also used to filter notifications that
are sent to members of groups on the group activity of other members. CAFs can be
criticized for being non-democratic in the sense that an OSN may decide the contents
that will be posted, without taking into account the preferences and opinions of users.
However, in Facebook for example, every user could have access to two different News
Feeds: a chronological one and other one created by the content active filtering (CAF)
control3. Then, such type of content filtering exists in some OSNs, and can be designed
in an efficient way given our analysis.
3.6 Numerical illustrations and reverse engineering
3.6.1 Stochastic Approximation and CAF
We first illustrate through simulations the theoretical results obtained in previous sec-
tions related to the posting behaviour dynamics and the CAF. First, we plot the conver-
gence of the stochastic approximation to the rest point x∗. Second, we demonstrate that
the diversity property can be obtained using the CAF defined in proposition 3.7.
The contents posted in the OSN are restricted to C = 3 sources, like the News
business example with French News companies described in section 3.3. Estimating
real influence matrices is out of the scope of the chapter. By the way, influence matrices
estimators can be used as input in our framework. We consider for the sake of example,
the following influence matrices:
A− =


0.6532 0.1888 0.1577
0.1838 0.6652 0.1507
0.1204 0.2129 0.6664

 ,
A+ =


0.658 0.2159 0.1258
0.1418 0.7092 0.1487
0.1718 0.1328 0.6951

 .
In this example, the sources have stronger influence with themselves than on another
source. The intensity of the Poisson point process associated with contents arrival is as-
sumed to be the same for each source c and equal to λc = 10. In fig. 3.3, we observe the
3https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/facebook-tips-whats-the-difference-between-
414305122130
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Figure 3.3: Simulation of the arrival of users and messages associated with 3 contents
without and with the CAF.
convergence of the dynamics of the average number of posts for the sources considering
the system with and without CAF. In our scenario, the CAF policy is given by the vec-
tor p∗ = (1,0.5,0.16). This control policy implies the convergence of the dynamics to a
distribution x∗ among contents which satisfies the diversity property, i.e. x∗1 = x
∗
2 = x
∗
3.
3.6.2 Estimation of influence through reverse engineering
Reverse engineering is a system engineering principle based on treated information usu-
ally through disassembling a system, in order to reproduce it. In our context, this idea
is applied considering the data set as an information that guides us to determine the in-
fluence matrices. Practically, we assume that the sources are competing for maximizing
the popularity of their content as proposed in section 3.4.3. We assume that each day,
denoted by t, sources are competing and they update their decision with the help of the
best-response algorithm. Let xNEc (t) be the posting rate of source c during day t. Thus
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according to (3.10), for each c,
xc(t + 1) = argmaxxc∈[0,1]Uc(xc, x̃−c(t)) =
λc
(∑c′ λc′ +(a
+
cc′ −a
−
cc′)λc)
(
∑
c′ 6=c
a+cc′xc′(t)
+ ∑
c′ 6=c
a−cc′(1− xc′(t))+ a
−
cc
)
+
λc
(∑c′ λc′ +(a
+
cc′ −a
−
cc′)λc)
∑
c′
(a+cc′ −a
−
cc′)εc′(t).
We use the least square method in order to estimate for each (c,c′) ∈
{Le Monde,Liberation,Le Figaro}2 and each c′, the following coefficients: A1cc′ :=
a+cc′ −a
−
cc′
a+cc −a
−
cc
(the associated matrix is A1) and D1c :=
∑c′ a
−
cc′
a+cc −a
−
cc
(where the associated vector
is D1). In the least square method, we solve the following optimization problem:
min
A1, D1
∥∥IdCx(t + 1)−A1x(t)−D1
∥∥2 ,
where IdC is the diagonal matrix of size C×C. Without loss of generality, we assume
that λc = 1 for each c. Based on our data set presented in section 3.3, we obtain the
following matrices:
A1 =


0 0.49938 0.20559
0.30016 0 −0.01863
0.34687 0.09159 0

 ,
and
D1 =


4.69251
6.75663
13.66454

 .
Note that this method aims to estimate the total influence of each source on the others. In
fact, we can assume that each source c knows his own influence, i.e. a+cc and a
−
cc. Given
this local knowledge and estimating the coefficient A1cc′ , each source c has an estimator
of the total influence of each source c′ on him, which is exactly the term a+cc′ − a
−
cc′ .
We first observe that there is not only positive or negative influences in the matrix A1,
which can be confirmed by the fact that the correlation matrix (3.1) has also positive
and negative coefficients. Moreover, it can be noticed that the source which has the
most influence on the others is Le Monde, which makes sense because it is one of the
most famous newspaper compared to the others4.
4https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presse_en_Francecite_
note-audipresseOne2012-6
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3.6.3 Best response algorithm
We describe in this section the convergence of the best-response algorithm described in
section 3.4.3. Sources decide simultaneously and only once, their posting rate for each
time slot, based on noisy observations of the rates of the others. The fact that sources
do not observe the real posting rate of the others comes from real-word considerations.
In order to show the impact of the uncertainty on the observations of the actions of the
other players, we also plot on fig. 3.4 the best response algorithm assuming perfect
knowledge. The dotted lines represents the case where the variance of the noise is equal
to 0.1. The straight line is for the case where sources have full knowledge of x−c(t).
We notice that the best response algorithm converges to the Nash Equilibrium, which
is equal, by computation to (0.35,0.15,0.87), in the case of perfect knowledge. In
the noisy scenario, the best response gives decisions that are close to the optimal ones
without noise.
Figure 3.4: Dynamic of the best response algorithm.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we first model the posting behaviour of sources in OSNs in several con-
tents which have externalities impact one over the other. Second we propose a content
active filtering in order to increase content diversity. We use a dynamical approach
(based on stochastic approximation theory) to model the posting behaviour of sources
taking into account these externalities. The convergence of the posting behaviour is
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proved and a game theoretical equivalent is proposed. Then we define a content active
filtering control, with an explicit form, in order to improve content diversity in the
OSN. Finally, all the theoretical results are illustrated through simulations and a data
set extracted from a real OSN is used to assess our results.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3.1
The proof is made in fours steps. In the first step we highlight the link between x(n)
and the system of differential equations (3.4). Then the rest point of the associated
system of differential equations is proved to be unique. In the third step, by using
Monotone Operator Theory [89] we prove that lim
t→∞
x(t) = x∗. Finally, by the using the
theory of stochastic approximation [46] we derive the convergence of x(n) to x∗.
Step 1: For each c, the evolution of xc(n) is described by the following stochastic
approximation:
xc(n+ 1) = xc(n)+
1
n+ 1
(ζc(n)− xc(n))
= xc(n)+
1
n+ 1
(P(Zc(n) ≥ θc,ξ (n) = c | x(n))− xc(n))
+
1
n+ 1
(ζc(n)−P(Zc(n) ≥ θc,ξ (n) = c | x(n))) .
It can be noticed that, for time n and source c:
E [Mc(n+ 1) | ζc(m), m ≤ n] :=
E [ζc(n+ 1)−P(Zc(n+ 1) ≥ θc,ξ (n+ 1) = c | x(n)) | ζc(m), m ≤ n]
= E[ζc(n+ 1) | ζc(m), m ≤ n]−P(Zc(n+ 1) ≥ θc,ξ (n+ 1) = c | x(n))
= P(Zc(n+ 1) ≥ θc,ξ (n+ 1) = c | x(n))×1
+P(Zc(n+ 1) < θc,ξ (n+ 1) = c | x(n))×0
−P(Zc(n+ 1) ≥ θc,ξ (n+ 1) = c | x(n)) = 0.
Thus Mc(n) is a martingale difference sequence of zero mean (see appendix of [46]
for a definition of martingale difference sequence). Following the previous argument,
the sequence x(n) can be thought as a noisy discretization of the following system of
differential equations:
ẋc(t) = P(Zc(t) ≥ θc,ξ (t) = c | x(t))− xc(t), ∀c. (3.20)
Step 2: It can be easily deduced that the rest point x∗ of (3.4) is solution of:
Bx∗+D = 0. (3.21)
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It can be noticed that B ∈ [0,1]C
2
is a strictly diagonally dominant matrix [90]. In-
deed, for all c,
| bcc | − ∑
c′ 6=c
| bcc′ |= 1+
λc
2∑c′ λc′
(a+cc −a
−
cc)−
λc
∑c′ λc′
∑
c′ 6=c
(a+cc′ −a
−
cc′) ≥ 0
Thus because B is strictly diagonally dominant, B is invertible and this implies that
(3.4) has a unique rest point given by:
∀c, x∗c = −
1
2∑c′′ λc′′
∑
c′
[B−1]cc′λc′(θc′)∑
c′
a−cc′ .
Step 3: We now study the stability of the unique rest point of (3.20). We study
the function:
V (x(t)) := ∑
c
(xc(t)− x
∗
c)
2, (3.22)
where x∗ is solution of (3.21). Then, for all x(t) we get
d
dt
V (x(t))
= 2 < x(t)−x∗,Bx(t)+D >
0=Bx∗+D
= 2 < x(t)−x∗,Bx(t)
+D−Bx∗−D >
= 2 < x(t)−x∗,Ax(t)−Ax∗ >
< 0
where the last inequality is coming from the fact that
1
2
(B+BT ) is a negative definite
matrix. Finally, V is a Lyapunov function and using LaSalle’s Invariance Principle [46],
we can deduce the following:
lim
t→∞
x(t) = x∗.
Step 4: Finally, we apply theorem 2 p.15 of [46] to show that x(n) (whose components
are given by (3.3)) converges almost surely to the compact invariant set of the o.d.e
(3.4) given by the singleton x∗.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
The proof is made in two steps. In the first step, we provide a characterization of the
Nash Equilibrium. In the second step we prove the equivalence. According to definition
3.8, a vector xNE ∈ RC is a Nash Equilibrium if for each source c ∈ {1, . . . ,C},
xNEc ∈ arg max
xc≥0
(
xc
λc
2∑c′ λc′
(Yc +
a+cc
2
xc +
a−cc
2
(1− xc))−
1
2
(xc)
2
)
. (3.23)
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where Yc := ∑
c′ 6=c
a−cc′(1− x
NE
c′ )+ ∑
c′ 6=c
a+cc′x
NE
c′ . We are dealing with a concave optimiza-
tion problem and the first order optimality conditions, for each source c, gives us the
following characterization. A posting rates vector xNE is a Nash Equilibrium if and
only if for each source c,
∂Uc
∂xc
(xNEc ,x
NE
−c ) = 0, with x
NE
c > 0, (3.24)
∂Uc
∂xc
(xNEc ,x
NE
−c ) ≤ 0, with x
NE
c ≥ 0, (3.25)
which are equivalent to the following:
λc
2∑c′ λc′
(∑
c′
a−c,c′(1− x
NE
c′ )+∑
c′
a+c,c′x
NE
c′ ) = x
NE
c , if x
NE
c > 0,
λc
2∑c′ λc′
(∑
c′
a−c,c′(1− x
NE
c′ )+∑
c′
a+c,c′x
NE
c′ ) ≤ x
NE
c , if x
NE
c ≥ 0.
Assuming the existence of an interior Nash equilibrium (Assumption 2), we then
obtain that the first order conditions given by equation (3.26) are equivalent to the rest
point solution obtained in Proposition 3.1. Thus, an interior Nash equilibrium of the
non-cooperative posting game is equivalent to the rest point of the posting behaviour
dynamics proposed in equations (3.21).
Proof of Proposition 3.6
We prove this proposition by looking at the necessary condition first, and sufficient
condition second.
• We prove the first necessary condition, i.e. if the rest point x∗ ∈ [0,1]C satisfies
(3.11) then ∀(c,c′′) ∈ C 2, we have:
λc ∑c′ a
−
cc′
λc ∑c′(a
−
cc′ −a
+
cc′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
=
λc′′ ∑c′ a
−
c′′c′
λc′′ ∑c′(a
−
c′′c′ −a
+
c′′c′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
.
According to Definition 3.5 and Theorem 3.1, if x∗ := [x, . . . ,x] satisfies the di-
versity property then, for all content c ∈ C , it is the unique solution of
λc
2∑c′ λc′
(∑
c′
a−c,c′(1− x
∗)+∑
c′
a+c,c′x
∗) = x∗, (3.26)
⇔ x∗ =
λc ∑c′ a
−
cc′
λc ∑c′(a
−
cc′ −a
+
cc′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
. (3.27)
Then this implies that for all ∀(c,c′′) ∈ C 2, we have:
λc ∑c′ a
−
cc′
λc ∑c′(a
−
cc′ −a
+
cc′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
=
λc′′ ∑c′ a
−
c′′c′
λc′′ ∑c′(a
−
c′′c′ −a
+
c′′c′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
.
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• We prove now the sufficient condition, i.e. if ∀(c,c′′) ∈ C 2 we have:
λc
λc(∑c′ ac,c′)+∑c′ λc′
=
λc′′
λc′′(∑c′ ac′′,c′)+∑c′ λc′
,
then the rest point x∗ ∈ [0,1]C satisfies the diversity condition given by equation
(3.11). We notice that for each content c ∈ C , we have that
y :=
λc ∑c′ a
−
cc′
λc ∑c′(a
−
cc′ −a
+
cc′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
is the unique solution (because of the non singularity of matrix B used in proof of
theorem 1) of the following equation:
λc
2∑c′ λc′
(∑
c′
a+cc′y+∑
c′
a−cc′(1− y)) = y. (3.28)
This last equality completes the sufficient condition and hence the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.7
According to proposition 3.6, having the equal proportion is equivalent to find p ∈
[0,1]C, ∀c ∈ C −{C}, such that:
pcλc ∑c′ a
−
cc′
pcλc ∑c′(a
−
cc′ −a
+
cc′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
=
pc′′λc′′ ∑c′ a
−
c′′c′
pc′′λc′′ ∑c′(a
−
c′′c′ −a
+
c′′c′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
.
We can notice that we are in presence of a non-convex non-concave function. Indeed,
we need to find p such that:
ac pc
bc pc + d
−
ac′ pc′
bc′ pc′ + d
= 0,
where all the parameters are positive. Thus
F(pc, pc′) =
ac pc
bc pc + d
−
ac′ pc′
bc′ pc′ + d
,
is concave in pc and convex pc′ . Because of this property, finding p such that (3.11) is
satisfied for a generic F(pc, pc′) remains an open question. However, in this particular
case we can find a way to solve this issue. Indeed, if we fix a particular pc∗ , which
provide us
Y :=
pc∗λc∗∑c′ a
−
c∗c′
pc∗λc∗∑c′(a
−
c∗c′ −a
+
c∗c′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
then the problem becomes to find p−c∗ ∈ [0,1]
C−1 such that
Y =
pcλc ∑c′ a
−
cc′
pcλc ∑c′(a
−
cc′ −a
+
cc′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
(3.29)
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where p−c∗ = (p1, . . . , pc∗−1, pc∗+1, . . . , pC). We use
c∗ = argmin c{
λc ∑c′ a
−
cc′
λc ∑c′(a
−
cc′ −a
+
cc′)+ 2∑c′ λc′
},
and pc∗ = 1. Finally, we just need to need to solve (3.29), and we get the solution.
Moreover, the control p does not impact the diagonal dominance of matrix B. This is
the reason why (3.13) still converges to x∗.
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This chapter is based on the paper Differential games of competition in online con-
tent diffusion.
4.1 Introduction
Online content delivery represents an ever increasing fraction of Internet traffic. In the
case of online videos, the support for content distribution is provided by commercial
platforms such as Vimeo or YouTube. In many cases, such contents are also delivered
by means of OSN platforms. One core feature of such systems is the delivery of user-
generated content (UGC): platform users become often producers of the contents which
populate those systems.
Reference figures for UGC platforms are indeed those of YouTube, with over 6
billion hours of videos watched each month, which averages as an hour for every person
on Earth a month. New UGCs are continuously created and 100 hours of video uploaded
every minute by the platform’s users1.
A relevant parameter for the UGC platforms owners is the viewcount, i.e., the num-
ber of times an item has been accessed. Viewcount in fact represents one of the possible
metrics to measure content popularity. In turn, a popular video becomes a source of
revenue because of click-through rates of linked advertisements: those are actually part
of the YouTube’s business model.
Among several research works in the field, many efforts have been spent to charac-
terize the dynamics of popularity of online media contents [91; 92; 93; 94; 95; 96]. The
ultimate target there would be indeed to provide models able to perform the early-stage
prediction of a content’s popularity [18].
Such studies have highlighted certain phenomena that are typical of UGC delivery.
A key study in [18] shows that the dynamics of popularity of online contents experiences
two phases. In the initial phase, a content gains popularity through advertisement and
other marketing tools. Afterwards, UGC platform mechanisms induce users to access
contents by re-ranking mechanisms. Those also appear to be main drivers of popularity.
Motivated by such findings, we model the behavior of those who create content –
shortly sources in the rest of the chapter – as a dynamic game. Once they generate a
content, in particular, they leverage on UGC platforms to diffuse it. We note that, by
paying a fee for the advertisement service of the UGC platform, a content provider is
able to receive a preferential treatment to her content in such a way that the rate of
propagation is increased. Clearly, this leads to a competition among sources to capture
the attention of potential viewers at faster rate than other contents.
1See: http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics/
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To this respect, the notion of acceleration is a key concept. An example reported in
Fig. 4.1 explains how a video can be accelerated by the UGC platform. In our example
we performed a generic search “Hakusai” which produces a series of output results for
matching contents. The one reported in the figure is one with viewcount 568507 that
has been listed by the main YouTube.
In particular, Fig. 4.1 represents the viewer’s screen: in the central part of the win-
dow stands the video. However, there exists a recommendation list on the right as
provided by the platforms’ search engine.
It is important to observe the two videos recommended on the top of the list. The
first one is an advertisement of a known commercial activity. In order to appear in the
top position of the list, that content has been paying a fee to the UGC platform owner. In
the second position, a link appears to a video which is tagged featured. The meaning of
the term featured is that the video linked there was placed high on the recommendation
list either because it is a very popular video or because it is a partner video. A partner
video, as in the case of advertisements, is from someone who pays a fee to rank higher
in the recommendation list. The other videos in the recommendation list are ranked
according to the default order, i.e., that induced by the recommendation system [97].
Another advertisement with the suggestion to buy a product is appearing at the bottom
of the figure. In this chapter we focus on the acceleration of featured videos. In fact, in
order to accelerate a video, customers perform a promoted video campaign on YouTube;
to do so, content providers are required four steps: choose a video, attach promotional
text, some keywords by which the promotion is performed, and set the daily budget
amount allowed.
With respect to the acceleration cost, it is important to note that the so called pay-
per-view model is applied. In other words, the YouTube pay-per-view policy for accel-
eration is meant to charge the source a fixed amount each time a viewer has accessed the
content. Charging is triggered by a click-through on the icons of the promoted content
which appear in the recommendation list. However, for the platform owner it is best
that the customer’s daily budget is attained. Then, the total cost paid in order to incre-
ment the number of views would increase linearly in time. A linear cumulative cost for
acceleration is also one of our assumptions in the rest of the chapter.
Now, since the viewer’ browser has finite size, only those who are able to appear in
the higher end of the recommendation list are visible without scrolling. Thus, those are
accessed with higher probability: the viewcount of a content is expected to grow faster,
i.e., to be accelerated, whenever it is showed higher in the list.
In this work, we consider a competition between several contents. The promotion
fees, i.e., the cost to accelerate the viewcount, will depend on the source and may depend
on the content itself. Even the rate of propagation, i.e., the rate at which viewers access
the content, may depend on the content. Finally, each source may decide whether or not
to purchase priority to accelerate the popularity of the content for a certain period.
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Figure 4.1: A sample video: the icons on the right of the main window is the recommen-
dation list. The upper entry seen there is a commercial advertisement, whereas the second
entry is tagged "Featured". The remaining entries are sorted according to their viewcount.
The objective of this chapter is to determine the best strategy for a source in order
to accelerate a content and study the equilibria of the resulting system. To this aim, we
propose a game theoretical framework rooted in differential games. The solution of the
problem allows us to provide guidelines for the advertisement strategies of sources.
A brief outline of the chapter follows. In Sec. 4.2 we revise the main results of the
literature for online content diffusion. In Sec. 4.3 we introduce the system model and
the differential game subject of this chapter. In Sec. 4.4 we derive the analysis of best
responses whereas symmetric Nash equilibria are characterized in Sec. 4.5. In Sec. 4.6
we tackle the limit case of small discounts. A section with conclusions, practical impli-
cations of our model and future research directions ends the chapter.
4.2 Related works
The dynamics of popularity of online contents has been attracting attention from the
research community. [93] proposed an analysis of the YouTube system focusing on
the characteristics of the traffic generated by that platform. [95] addressed the relation
between metrics used to evaluate popularity, such as number of comments, ratings, or
favorites. In this chapter our analysis is restricted to the viewcount.
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In [94] the authors study the ranking change induced by UGC online platforms.
Bursty acceleration in content’s viewcount is found to depend on the way online plat-
forms expose popular contents to users and on re-ranking of existing contents. Here, we
model the competition that arises when several sources leverage such acceleration tools.
In the literature, competition in epidemic processes has been addressed with game
theoretical tools. In [98], the authors focus on an economic game on graphs, where firms
try to conquer the largest market share. They derive the complexity for the computation
of the equilibria of the game; results for the price of anarchy in those games have been
developed recently in [99].
The emergence of equilibria of the Wardrop type has been studied in [100] from
viewer’s perspective. Our objective here is to describe the source viewpoint in a dynamic
game framework.
In [15] the authors consider information propagation through OSNs. The question
there is how the finite budget of attention of individuals influences the rate at which
contents can be pushed into the other players’ network. In our work, we limit our focus
to the case of online content diffusion in UGC platforms.
Novel contributions: In this chapter, we provide a complete framework for the analysis
of dynamic games in UGC provision. Under a meanfield approximation for contents
diffusion, differential games [43] provide the model for capturing the strategic behavior
of competing sources. Our main findings are:
• The structure of the best response of sources and a method for calculating it;
• Conditions for the existence and uniqueness of symmetric Nash equilibria in
threshold form;
• Approximated asymmetric Nash equilibria in the regime of small discounts.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, results on Nash equilibria for differential games
in UGC provision have not been derived so far in the literature.
4.3 System Model
The main symbols used in the chapter are reported in Tab. 4.1.
In our system model we assume that N competing sources release a content each
and viewers will access one of such contents at the earliest chance.
We assume a base of M potential viewers who can access each of the N contents.
To this respect, we adopt a fluid approximation which is assumed to hold for large M,
and we assume that content viewers access content i according to a point process with
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Table 4.1: Main notations used throughout the chapter 4
Symbol Meaning
N number of players (sources)
λi intensity of views per second for content i
τ time horizon
xi(t) fraction of viewers having viewed content i at time t
x(t) summation ∑
i
xi(t)
y(t) y(t) := 1− x(t)
zi :=xi(0) will be taken 0 unless otherwise stated.
ui(t) acceleration control (strategy) for player i; u = (u1,u2, . . . ,uN)
ui(t) ∈ [umin,umax]
1 ≤ umin < umax < ∞
u−i(t) strategy profile for all players different from i
a sum of the λiui
a−i sum of the λ ju j for all players j 6= i
pi discount factor for player i, pi > 0
intensity λi. In other words, content i is accessed by a randomly picked viewer every
λ−1i seconds.
In general λi 6= λ j: in fact, contents may experience diverse popularity, and therefore
different intensities. Every source will participate to the content diffusion in some time
frame [0,τ ]. Also, τ = ∞ in the development of the infinite horizon formulation of the
game.
Using the advertisement options of the platform, sources can pay a cost in order
to accelerate the diffusion of their video: viewers will access the content according to
the intensity uiλi, where ui ≥ 1 is the acceleration control for player i. The maximum
acceleration is bounded as umax, and the minimum acceleration is umin: 1 ≤ umin < umax.
Finally, there is a linear cost paid for the acceleration control: such a cost represents
the ideal case, i.e., when a promoted content receives per day a certain number of new
views per cent paid to the platform owner. Conversely, the case with no acceleration,
namely, ui = umin, falls back to the default intensity uminλi. Of course, this happens
at zero cost. Also, we consider somehow an ideal platform where only the content
owner who promotes the video can benefit from the acceleration.To do so, we assume
that the platform owner acts in such a way to make the access exclusive, i.e., so that
targeted viewers tend not acquire a competing content after accessing another one, e.g.,
by making recommendation sets disjoint [97].2
We introduce below the game model that we use to describe the competition among
2To confirm this rationale, we observe that featured videos never appear together in the recommenda-
tion list presented to users.
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sources in order to accelerate the dynamics of the viewcount. The formulation of the
problem is initially provided in general to cover both in the finite horizon and in the
infinite horizon case. Within the scope of the chapter, our development is confined to
the infinite horizon analysis.
4.3.1 Game model
The differential game model for online content diffusion is composed as follows.
Players: players are sources, who compete in order to diffuse their content over a base
of potential viewers. Since all players share the same base, the formulation will result
in a competitive differential game.
Strategies: the strategy of each player is the acceleration control. The control is thus
dynamic, since each player should determine at each point in time the acceleration ui(t).
Utilities: the utility for player i is linear and has two terms. First, there is a cost paid
for accelerating the content. Second, there is a revenue represented by the number of
copies. The total utility is defined, as customary in differential games, as the integral of
an instantaneous utility.
We denote by xi the fraction of viewers who have accessed to the contents gener-
ated by the i-th source. The governing equation for the dynamics of the i-th content’s
viewcount is
ẋi = λiui(1− x), i = 1,2, . . . ,N (4.1)
where x =
N
∑
i=1
xi is the total fraction of viewers who accessed some content; the initial
condition is xi(0) = zi. Actually, (4.1) is a fluid approximation for the dynamics of the
fraction of viewers of content i.
The fluid approximation which we use in this context can be justified formally with
the derivation proposed by [101]. In particular, let X̂(M)(t) be a N dimensional vector
whose components are X̂ (M)i (t), for i= 1, . . . ,N. Here, X̂
(M)
i (t) stands for the fraction of
the potential viewers that watched the content at time t, when the basin of users has size
M: it represents the branching process of the i-th content being watched. Thus, when we
refer to fluid approximations that describe the dynamics of the fraction viewers watching
the content, we are referring the meanfield approximation of such process. In particular,
for a formal explanation of the convergence for large M to the fluid approximations of
the type used hereafter, the reader can refer to [102].
The acceleration control ui, namely the strategy of player i, belongs to the space of
the piecewise continuous functions U = {u ∈ p.w.c. functions of [umin,umax]
[0,τ ]}.
Hence, because the control is upper bounded, the above ODE system (4.1) is Lip-
schitz continuous, and because it is lower bounded, it is so uniformly in the control,
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so that a solution at large is guaranteed to exist unique for a given strategy profile
u = (u1, . . . ,uN) ([44], pp. 99).
The cost function for the i-th player is given by
Ji(x,u) =
∫ ∞
0
e−pis (−ẋi(s)+ γi(ui(s)−umin))ds
=
∫ ∞
0
e−pisℓ(xi,ui)ds (4.2)
where γi > 0, pi ≥ 0 is a discount factor; here ℓ(xi,ui) = −ẋi + γi(ui −1).
A cautionary remark: in the infinite horizon case, the discount factor has the role of
ensuring the existence of a finite cost. Besides that, looking at (4.2), we observe that a
large value of pi > 0 characterizes an "impatient" player who aims at fast dissemination
of the content. Conversely, a "patient" player would use a small value of pi.
In particular, we note that for p = 0 the cost function has a more familiar expression
Ji(x,u) = −xi(τ) + γi(
∫ τ
0
(ui(s)− umin))ds where the dependence on the number of
copies appears with no discount. In Sec. 4.6 we are studying an approximation of our
differential game that provides closed form expression of the threshold type for the
infinite horizon case for vanishing discounts. In that case, the first term of (4.2) can be
approximated assuming very large values of τ so that
∫ τ
0
e−pisẋi(s)ds =
e−piτxi(τ)− zi
1− pi
→ xi(τ)− zi as pi ↓ 0
Finally, the problem we want to solve is thus to determine the optimal cost function,
namely the value function Vi(x) .
Definition 4.1 (Best response). For any strategy u−i of the remaining players, determine
the best response, i.e., the optimal control u∗i of player i for which the value function is
attained, i.e.,
Vi(x) := inf
ui∈U
Ji(x,ui). (4.3)
We will solve the problem using the discounted formulation in the infinite horizon:
pi > 0 for all players, and τ = ∞.
4.4 Best response analysis
Best response strategies are determined using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
(HJB) for the infinite horizon.
80
4.4. Best response analysis
4.4.1 Infinite horizon with positive discount p > 0
The existence of the optimal cost function bounded and uniformly continuous is im-
mediate from [44] Prop. 2.8, since the ℓ(·, ·) is bounded and uniformly Lipschitz, it
holds:
|ℓ(x,ui)− ℓ(y,ui)| ≤ λiumax|x− y|,ℓ(x,ui)| ≤ λiumax. (4.4)
In particular, we can write the Hamiltonian for each one of the players with respect to
the dynamical system (4.1) corresponding to the problem in (4.1). Before that, it is easy
to see that the aggregated dynamics can be written as
ẋ = ∑λiui(1− x), (4.5)
for which we will develop the optimal control for each one of the players having fixed
the control of the competing ones. In particular, the optimal control needs to maximize
the Hamiltonian
Hi(x,ζ ) = sup
u∈U
{
−∑λiui(1− x)ζ
+(uiλi(1− x)− γi(ui −umin))} . (4.6)
The maximization of (4.6) provides the closed loop solution of our problem. However,
the optimal cost function Vi in turn is one solving the HJB equation
piVi +Hi
(
x,
∂V
∂x i
)
= 0 (4.7)
so that minimizing the cost function Vi is equivalent to maximize Hi
(
x,
∂V
∂x i
)
[44],
where
∂V
∂x i
=
d
dx
Vi(x). In turn, we can write in closed form based on (4.1) and (4.5).
Hi(x) = uminγi −∑
j 6=i
u jλ j(1− x)
∂V
∂x i
+ sup
ui∈U
{
ui[λi(1− x)(1−
∂V
∂x i
)− γi]
}
. (4.8)
Now, since we observe that the Hamiltonian is linear in ui, if a maximum is attained at
some control u∈U , the intuition is that it may assume only extremal values as it is often
seen in the case of open-loop type of solutions [43]. This is actually true: we can allow
the control u to take values only on the vertices as the ones of the codomain polyhedron,
i.e., [umin,umax]
N . The value function will be the same of the original problem where
such restriction does not hold (see [44], pp.113). This is due to the fact that (4.1) is of
the type ẋ := f1(x) + f2(x)u and of the running cost function ℓ which is linear in the
control.
Motivated by this observation, we are interested in a class of best responses, namely
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Definition 4.2. A strategy ui is of the bang-bang type if it takes extremal values umin and
umax only.
Also, we denote tik,k = 1,2, . . . the switching times associated with best response ui,
and [tik, tik+1) represents the corresponding k-th switching period of player i. If we limit
our analysis to the best responses of bang-bang type, then ui ∈ {umin,umax}, i = 1, . . . ,N:
best responses are in fact piecewise constants.
In particular, for the case of bang-bang strategies, the condition for optimality, i.e.,
a best response, writes from (4.8)
ui(x) =



umin if λi(1− x)(1−
∂V
∂x i
)− γi < 0
umax if λi(1− x)(1−
∂V
∂x i
)− γi > 0
. (4.9)
We can denote by switching interval the interval of time between two consecutive
switching instants: within such interval, the best responses are constant, i.e., u is
constant and only assumes values in {umin,umax}
N . We can resume our findings above
with the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. The value function Vi corresponding to the best response of the game can
be attained by a strategy ui of the bang-bang type.
It is worth noting that in general the solution of HJB equations requires to search for
a viscosity solution [44]. This is due to the fact that the classical solutions assuming the
differentiability of the value function may not exist in general and thus require to solve
a general notion of differentiation. Here, it is the structure of the system that spares us
this step, since we know apriori that the best response is of the bang-bang type. The
main difference with respect to the general case is that strategies uis draw values in the
finite set ui ∈ {umin,umax}; again, compared to the general problem, this fundamental
simplification is due to the linear structure of the source game.
4.4.2 Infinite horizon for pi > 0
In order to decide on the sign of the above terms, we need to solve for the HJB equation
in Vi. This is in fact possible, once we notice that (4.7) can be written as the following
ODE
piVi −a(1− x)DVi + bi(1− x)+ c = 0, (4.10)
where Vi is the value function that solves for the best response.
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Here we simplify the notation by letting
ci = γi(umin −ui),
bi = λiui,
a = ∑λiui. (4.11)
Whenever convenient, for the sake of clarity, we will denote a by a(ui) to stress
the fact that strategy profile a depends on the best response of player i, and we will
also resort sometimes to the notation a−i := ∑
j 6=i
λiui for the sum of piecewise constant
controls played by all the remaining players. It is important to note that a and bi are
assumed constant during each switching interval.
Also, note that since we do not know the optimal control, the expression for solving
(4.10) here depends on the specific switching interval. Hence, Vi will have a specific
dependence on the control which we need to maximize aposteriori since we know that
(4.3) holds.
The solution of the HJB equation above can be solved as (see App. 4.9)
Vi(x) = K · (1− x)
−
pi
a −
pibi(1− x)+ (pi + a)ci
pi(pi + a)
, (4.12)
where K is a real constant.
In the following considerations we need the closed form of the function that is max-
imized by the control ui in (4.8)
Ti(ui,a−i)(x)=ui
[
(1−
bi
pi + a
)(1−x)−
K pi
a
(1− x)−
pi
a −
γi
λi
]
. (4.13)
As a first step, from (4.12) we can obtain information on the structure of the value
function. In particular we resume some basic facts in the following.
Lemma 4.4. i. The best response u∗i has a finite number of switches.
ii. There exists a threshold value of x∞ such that u
∗
i (x) = umin for all x > x∞ for every
player i.
Furthermore, we can characterize immediately a class of problems where players
have no incentive to accelerate anyway: in particular we see that the following sufficient
condition holds:
Lemma 4.5 (Degenerate Nash Equilibrium). i. Consider λi < γi, then the best response
for the player i is u∗i = umin irrespective of the other players strategies. ii. If λi < γi for
i = 1, . . . ,N, then u∗i = umin, i = 1, . . . ,n is the unique Nash equilibrium.
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From the above results, we can see that the general form of the best response for
player i against the strategy profile u−i for the remaining players can be determined
by proceeding backwards from the latest switching value xi,∞ which is calculated first.
Then, by continuity, the constant K appearing in (4.12) for the switching interval before
the last one (where now player i would use umax) can be determined by imposing the
continuity of the value function. In fact, at the switching time, the expression (4.12) has
different values of bi and ai in the two adjacent switching intervals. The procedure can
be iterated backwards to determine all the threshold values of x when player i switches.
In the case of a symmetric game, i.e., when the sources have all the same parameters,
the procedure described above can solve the game in closed form, as showed in the next
section where symmetric equilibria are described.
4.5 Symmetric Nash Equilibrium
We consider now the symmetric case: λi = λ , γi = γ , pi = p for all i = 1, . . . ,N. The
proofs of the statements hereafter are deferred to the Appendix. We consider tagged
source i, and assume that all the remaining players use the same threshold type of strat-
egy, i.e., of the type
u j(x) =
{
umax if x < x̂
umin if x > x̂
(4.14)
for some 0 ≤ x̂ ≤ 1. Denote x∗ the last switch of player i: we are now ready to show
that there exists a symmetric equilibrium where also player i will use x̂ = x∗, i.e., the
threshold type strategy (4.14) is the best response to itself when all sources play it.
Furthermore, it is the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game.
In particular such a Nash equilibrium is given by a threshold x∗ which is derived by
the form of the value function in the last switching interval (recall that K = 0 in that
interval)
Vi(x) = −
uminλ (1− x)
(p+Nλumin)
, (4.15)
by imposing that T (umin,umin(N −1))(x
∗) = 0 (switching condition). These results are
detailed formally in the statements below.
Lemma 4.6. Consider x∗ ≥ x̂, then the following holds:
i. Player i can switch at some 0 < x∗ < 1 iff λ (1−
uminλ
(p+Nλumin)
)− γ > 0; moreover,
x∗ = 1−
γ(p+Nλumin)
λ (p+(N −1)uminλ )
. (4.16)
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ii. Consider all players switch at x∗: the constant K∗ which ensures the continuity of the
value function Vi(x) at the switching threshold x
∗ is positive and the following relation
holds
K∗=(umax −umin)(1− x
∗)
p
λnumax
{
(1− x∗) pλumin
(N + pλumax )(N +
p
λumin
)
+
γ
p
}
.
Theorem 4.7 (Symmetric Nash Equilibrium). If λ (1−
uminλ
(p+Nλumin)
)− γ > 0, then
the threshold type strategy (4.14) where x̂ = x∗ and x∗ is as defined in Lemma 4.6 is the
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game.
The existence of equilibria in the non symmetric case is the next question that
we are answering. In particular, we obtain certain asymmetric equilibria which are
ε-approximated Nash equilibria. In other words, the unilateral deviation from those
strategy profiles may provide some improvement to the utility of a source. However,
such improvement can be made arbitrarily small by choosing an appropriate value of
the discount pi.
4.6 Vanishing discount regime
Hereafter, we consider the cases of small discount factors. As described in Sec. 4.3.1,
we can consider the case when pi has a very small value. This means that player i
does not pose much of a constraint on the time taken in order to make the content
popular. In particular, we would consider the case of vanishing discounts sequences:
pi(r) = o(1), i = 1, . . . ,N and consider the form of the best replies in the regime of
vanishing discounts. This provides further insight into the structure of the equilibria for
the sources game.
Corollary 4.8. Consider pi(r) = o(1): there exists a best reply in threshold form for
the i-th player that is arbitrarily close to the best reply of the game for a small enough
discount factor.
Because of the above result, we can always find a discount factor small enough so
as to find a threshold type strategy which approximates the cost function of the best
response within an arbitrarily small positive additive constant ε > 0. In turn, this also
means that if a Nash equilibrium exists under the modified utility function T̃ (·), then it
is an ε-approximated Nash equilibrium in threshold policy for the original game. It is
hence interesting to study the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the modified game.
Theorem 4.9 (Asymmetric ε- approximated Nash Equilibrium). If λi = λ for i =
1, . . . ,N and λ > γ1 > γ2 > .. . > γN . Then, there exists an ε-approximated Nash equi-
librium in threshold form for the original game.
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We note that the constructive proof of the ε-approximated Nash equilibrium states
that if some player stops accelerating, it will not have incentives to accelerate later for
larger values of the state x, because the increment in the state x is decreasing. Overall,
the above result suggests that in the fully asymmetric case, the presence of diverse costs
induces an equilibrium in threshold form where even if a source has an incentive in
deviating from the given strategy profile, and therefore change strategy, the incentive
that the player has in deviating can be made small at wish by choosing an appropriate
value of the discount.
4.7 Finite horizon case
When there is a finite horizon 0≤ τ <∞ under a nonnegative discount, the HJB equation
becomes [44]
V̇i + pVi +H(x,DVi) = 0 (4.17)
The natural initial condition Vi(x,0) = 0 for all x ∈ R, because the terminal cost is null.
Hence, the value function solves the following PDE
V̇i + pVi −a(1− x)DVi + b(1− x)+ c = 0 (4.18)
(4.18) is linear and the associated homogeneous PDE is
V̇i + pVi −a(1− x)DVi = 0 (4.19)
whose solution is in the form V omi (x, t) = φ (a
−1 log(1−x)− t)(1−x)−
p
a , where φ (v) :
R → R is a differentiable function.
Hence we just need a particular solution: we seek one such solution in the form
Vi(x, t) = Vi,p(x), so that it should solve
piVi −a(1− x)DVi + b(1− x)+ c = 0
The solution is found to be:
Vi(x) =



(1− x)−
pi
a −
pib(1− x)+ (pi + a)c
pi(pi + a)
if pi > 0
b
a
x−
c
a
log(1− x) if pi = 0
(4.20)
Finally, the solution of (4.18) is determined to be
Vi(x, t) = φ (a
−1 log(1− x)− t)(1− x)−
pi
a +Vi,p(x)
Since we are faced with a undetermined function φ , one per switching interval, we
shortly describe how to calculate the best response. In the first switching interval [0, t1],
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the natural initial condition V (x,0) = 0 for all x ∈ [0,1). This provides the closed form
expression for φ (·), which is found by
φ (a−1 log(1− x)− t)(1− x)−
p
a +Vp(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ R.
In particular, we obtain for the case p > 0:
φ (v) = −1+ epv(
b
p+ a
eav +
c
p
)
so that in the first switching interval we can state
V (x, t) = −(1− e−pt)[
c
p
+
b
p+ a
(1− x)] (4.21)
Now, once determined the best response for player i in the first switching interval by
(4.8), we should impose the continuity condition on V (x, t) = V (x, t1). This provides
the initial condition for the second interval. Proceeding to the subsequent intervals, the
procedure can be iterated to determine the value function for the best response of player
i. It is worth noting that in this case the switching thresholds will depend on time.
4.8 Numerical Results
We provide hereafted a numerical description of the results for the sources’ best re-
sponse. It is interesting to visualize the best reply of a certain source facing different
strategies of the remaining ones. In Fig. 4.2a) and b) we reported on the best response
in the vanishing discount regime as a function of a−i in the homogeneous scenario, i.e.,
γi = γ and λi = λ0 for i = 1, . . . ,N. Here, umax = 10 and umin = 1.
The graphs of Fig. 4.2a) and b) refer to two values N = 10 and N = 30, respectively.
The value of λ0 is settled to 100 views per day, whereas γ = 0.7 ·λ .
The best response is depicted using different markers for umin and umax: for a fixed
value of a−i the best response starts with umax and switches to umin above the threshold
x0,i. In both cases a) and b) the threshold value decreases with a−i. This is competition’s
effect: larger a−i values mean more players using umax. Hence, the number of views that
can be expected are small so that the cost for accelerating takes over. Hence the switch
occurs at lower values of x.
Finally, we observe the floor at 1−
γ
λ
: this is the limit best response for a large
number of players as from (4.23). For a very large number of competing contents, the
best response of the single player should depend on γ and λ only. When this happens,
in fact, the game becomes singular: a unique best response for every player exists which
defines the only equilibrium of the system.
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Figure 4.2: a) and b): best reply for λi = λ0 = 100 views/day, umax = 10, umin = 1, p = λ ,
and γi = γ = 0.7λ ; a) N = 10 and b) N = 30; c): impact of cost on the best response; d) case
for heterogeneous scenario: λi = λ0 for i= 1, . . . ,N/2 and λi = 2λ0 for i=N/2+1, . . . ,N,
N = 10.
In Fig. 4.2c) we observe the best response for N = 10 and for increasing values
of γ/λ : clearly, larger values of the ratio makes players accelerate less because of
increased cost. Again, we observe that the effect of competition is to reduce the accel-
eration for larger values of players using umax, i.e., larger values of a−i. However, for
small values of the cost, not only the best reply is to use a large threshold, but the strat-
egy of competing sources becomes less and less relevant so that the threshold becomes
almost constant in a−i.
In the last figure, i.e., Fig. 4.2d), we considered an heterogeneous scenario. In this
case, contents i = 1, . . . ,5 have λi = λ0, whereas i = 6, . . . ,10 have λi = 2λ0. In this case
we expect that a−1 and a−10 in the example may be different. Hence, we are interested
in the relative behavior of best response of the two type of players.
As seen in the figure, the switching order x0,1 < x0,10 is maintained for increasing
values of a−i: players with higher value of λi always switch before. Actually, even
88
4.9. Conclusions
for a small number of players as in this example, the range of values taken by a−i is
basically the same for both types of players. As a consequence, the ratio γi/λi is the
main parameter characterizing the relative behavior of the two classes of players, i.e.,
the switching order.
4.9 Conclusions
We have introduced models for advertisement in online content diffusion where sources
compete to make contents popular. They leverage on acceleration tools of online plat-
forms in order to increase the viewcount of their videos. By doing so, contents occupy
positions that are more visible on the web pages of potential viewers. However, a fee is
paid in order to profit from re-ranking mechanisms of online platforms.
Hence, each player, e.g., each source, needs to decide over time if it is worth to
accelerate or not. And, this choice is dynamic depending on what other sources do. We
introduced a model based on differential games: players’ best responses are determined
by solving an ODE involving the Hamiltonian of the system they observe.
We showed that in the infinite horizon case, the closed loop best replies of players
are of the bang-bang type in the state x. We have identified a unique threshold-type
Nash equilibrium in the symmetric case and we found that dual counterparts exist in the
fully asymmetric case for small discounts.
Practical implications. We derived the existence of Nash equilibria in threshold
form in the symmetric and (ε-approximate) in the asymmetric case. However, we con-
jecture that Nash equilibria in threshold form do exist also for any choice of the λis and
the γis. Thus, sources would only pay when the total fraction of views is below a certain
threshold and stop promoting above it. Now, we can observe (4.16) closer, and draw the
following conclusions when the equilibrium is reached:
a) all-or-nothing effect: content i with low potential, i.e., very small λi, will not be ac-
celerated at all when λi < γi. Hence, sources compete by promoting first contents likely
to become most popular, e.g., with larger values of λi.
b) best response and promotion: the best response is of the threshold type, so that
sources are able to maximize the number of views while minimizing the cost by using
the maximum promotion budget per day until the threshold is reached.
c) daily budget: the daily budget γ determines the threshold x∗ in such a way that the
larger the cost which is paid per day, the lower x∗. From the platform owner perspective,
for a given cumulative budget paid by a customer, the smaller the threshold, the lesser
the promotion time will last. This is indeed convenient for the sake of system’s re-
sources: larger acceleration fares will lead to shorter promotion campaigns with smaller
load for the platform’s promotion mechanisms.
Future works. The results of our chapter indicate that these game models can lead
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to new tools for the pricing of online content advertisement and for the prediction of
content popularity. There are several interesting research directions that are left for
future work. First, the dynamic setting in the finite horizon case appears the most
immediate extension. In future work, we plan to study the effect of the horizon duration
onto the equilibria and the effect that time constraints have on sources’ strategies.
Another aspect relates to the number of competitors: in the case of large N, the strategy
of single players does not change significantly other players’ utility and the strategy
profile u−i. To this respect, the dynamic game formulation could be reduced in the limit
of large N to a static formulation which could be studied using Wardrop-like equilibria
[100].
APPENDIX
Proof of lemma 4.4:
i. By contradiction: assume an infinite number of switches for player i and define
constants Kr, r = 1, . . . ,∞, for each such switching interval. By the continuity of x and
the continuity of Vi(x), together with (4.12), there exists an infinite sequence of Krs
which are non zero. Hence, since x ↑ 1, by the continuity of x, we can find sequence
{xr} ↑ 1 where xr belongs to the r-th switching interval. Due again to (4.12), we found
a subsequence of values of Vi which diverges. This is a contradiction since the value
function is bounded.
ii. Denote xi,∞ the value of x above which the control switches to umin for good: indeed,
the constant appearing in (4.12) is zero. If it was not, again, Vi would grow unbounded
as x → 1. Hence, DVi is bounded for x > xi,∞, so that by inspection of (4.6), the control
needs to be umin for values of x close to 1, and on the rest of the last switching in-
terval as well since it is constant there. Finally, we can define x∞ = max(xi,∞,1≤ i≤N).
Proof of lemma 4.5:
i. This is a consequence of the statement in Lemma.4.4: in the last switching interval,
since K = 0, from (4.13)
Ti(ui,a−i)(x) ≤ ui

(1−
bi
a(umin)
1+ pia(umin)
)−
γi
λi

< 0
The rightmost inequality is equivalent to
a−i + pi
a(umin)+ pi
<
γi
λi
which can also be written as (λi − γi)(a−i + pi)< γiλiumin. The statement follows once
we observe that the previous result is independent of a−i, i.e., the strategies played by
all the other players.
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ii. Follows immediately from i.
Proof of lemma 4.6:
(i) The proof is made in three steps. In the first step we prove that
T (umin, (N − 1)umin)(x) is decreasing for x > x
∗ (we use notation T (x) when it
does not generate confusion). In the second step we derive the sufficient condition
in the assumptions. Finally, in the third step we compute x∗ and the corresponding
constant K∗.
Step 1. From (4.15), in the last switching interval we have
DVi =
uminλ
(p+Nλumin)
If we plug in DVi in T (x) we finally have:
T (x) = (1− x)(1−
uminλ
(p+Nλumin)
)−
γ
λ
so that DT (x) < 0.
Step 2. Since T (x) is decreasing in the last switching interval, a threshold when
player i switches to umin exists if and only if T (0) > 0, which is the assumption in the
statement, namely 1−
uminλ
p+Nλumin
>
γ
λ
.
Step 3. The threshold x∗ for player i is obtained by solving
T (x∗) = 0 ⇔ x∗ = 1−
γ
λ
·
p+λ N umin
p+λ (N −1)umin
Now we can assume for player i a switch occurs in x∗. Hence, we impose the
continuity of the value function [44]. Because it is continuous on both sides of the
threshold x∗, the limit values Vi(x
−) for x ↑ x∗ when (ui,a−i) = (umax, (n−1)umax) and
Vi(x
+) for x ↓ x∗ when (ui,a−i) = (umin, (n− 1)umin) need to be the same. This will
determine constant K∗. The equation to be solved is thus
K∗(1− x∗)−
p
λnumax −
λumax(1− x∗)
p+λNumax
−
γ
p
(umax −umin)
= −
uminλ (1− x∗)
p+Nλumin
(4.22)
and the expression for K∗ writes as in the statement. Finally, we observe from (4.22)
that indeed, K > 0: in fact
umaxλ
p+Nλumax
>
uminλ
p+Nλumin
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which concludes the proof.
Proof of theorem 4.7:
We first need to ensure that when source i plays against (4.14) with x̂ = x∗ for all the
remaining players, the switch for player i is unique. Indeed, for x < x∗ it holds
DT (ui,a−i)(x) =
−λ (1− bia+p)(1− x)
p
a+1 − λ
2 pK∗
a2
(1− x)
p
a+1
.
However, we note that we are in the assumptions of Lemma 4.6, so that K∗ > 0. Thus,
for x < x∗, indeed DT (ui,a−i)(x)< 0 by inspection of the above equation. This ensures
that there is not any other switch for player i, so that the strategy of player i is also
threshold with x̂ = x∗. Indeed, threshold strategy (4.14) with x̂ = x∗ for all players is
a best reply to itself for all players, so that it defines a Nash equilibrium for the game.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium is obtained by the fact that (4.15) has a unique zero.
Proof of corollary 4.8:
If ζr =
pi(r)
a
, we can write (4.13) as
T (ui,a−i) = ui

(1−
λiui
∑k λkuk
1+ ζn
)y−Kζry
−ζr −
γi
λi


= ui
[
(1−
λiui
∑k λkuk
)(1−ζr + o(ζr))y−
γi
λi
+Kζr(yui −ζn + o(ζr)))
]
= ui[(1−
λiui
∑k λkuk
)y−
γi
λi
]+ ζr f (y)+ o(ζr)
where y = 1− x and f (y) = ui(y
λiui
∑k λkuk
−1/yζr). We already noticed that there exists
x∞ above which every player switches to umin: we can hence restrict our discussion to the
range y∈ [1−x∞,1]. Indeed, f (y) is bounded therein: denote T̃ (ui,a−i) = ui(
λiui
∑k λkuk
−
γi
λi
).
Hence, we can fix ε > 0 and consider r > ro such that |T̃ (ui)−T (ui)|< ε uniformly
in y. The best response of user i will at most produce a value function that differs
by ε from the one which maximizes (4.8). Hence, we search for the solution of the
maximization problem
ũ∗i = argmax
ui∈{umin,umax}
T̃ (ui)
which corresponds to a modified game where the cost function is T̃ . We hence need
to state when T̃ (umin,a−i) is larger or smaller than T̃ (umax,a−i): this turns out to be
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equivalent to the condition for the state x to exceed or not the threshold
x0,i := 1−
γi
λi
1
(1+ λiumina−i )(1+
λiumax
a−i
)
(4.23)
so that the final control law that governs the best reply of the i-th player. is
ũ∗i (x) =
{
umax if x ≤ x0,i
umin if x > x0,i
, (4.24)
which concludes the proof.
Proof of theorem 4.9:
We assume the regime of vanishing discounts in a such way that ε is defined in
the sense of Thm. 4.8. The proof is based on the following observation: at time 0,
u∗i (0) = umax because of (4.23) and λ > γi for all is. Clearly, since γ1 > γi for i > 1,
then x0,1 < x0,i for i > 1, and t1 corresponds to the switch of node 1 from umax to umin.
Also, a−i(t
−
1 ) = umaxN > umax(N − 1) + umin = a−i(t
+
1 ) for all players i > 1, so that
x0,i(t
−
1 ) < x0,i(t
+
1 ). Thus, u
∗
i (t
−
1 ) = u
∗
i (t
+
1 ) = umax. Finally, until x < x0,2(a−i(t
+
1 )), all
players different from i will use umax.
By induction: assume that first k−1 players that switched from umax to umin did not
switch back and prove that under the conditions in the assumptions even the k-th player
will never switch from umin to umax.
In order to proceed further with the proof we need to precise some notations
• x0,i(k) is the threshold (4.23) for player i when k players already switched to umin;
• a−i(k) is the sum of the other players λ ju j when k of them switched to umin.
At the time when player k+ 1 switches, it holds x(tk+1) = x0,k(k). Hence, in order for
player k+1 not to switch back to umax, it must hold that x(tk+1)> x0,k(k+1). However,
we know that the dynamics in the k-th switching period is
x(tk+1) = 1− (1− x0,k(k−1)))e
−ak(tk+1−tk).
Also, by the inductive assumption, x0,k(k − 1) = x0,k(k) because no player switched
back to umax. Then, since ak is constant in the k-th switching period, the dynamics in
that interval are governed by condition
1− x0,k(k+ 1)
1− x0,k(k)
> e−ak∆tk+1 (4.25)
Moreover, we have a condition on ∆tk+1 = tk+1 − tk:
x0,k(k) = 1− (1− x0,k(k))e
−ak(tk+1−tk)
⇒ ∆tk+1 = log(
1− x0,k+1(k)
1− x0,k(k)
). (4.26)
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combining (4.25) and (4.26) we obtain
1− x0,k(k+ 1)
1− x0,k(k)
>
1− x0,k+1(k)
1− x0,k(k)
⇒ x0,k(k+ 1) < x0,k+1(k) (4.27)
We can now express the above condition by considering the explicit expression
x0,k(k+ 1) =
γk
λ
1
(1+ uminvk )(1+
umax
vk
)
,
where vk :=
a−k(k+ 1)
λk
. Also, in the same way,
x0,k+1(k) =
γk
λ
1
(1+ uminvk+1 )(1+
umax
vk+1
)
,
where vk+1 :=
a−(k+1)(k)
λk
. Finally, we observe that
vk = (N −1− k)umax + kumin = vk+1,
so that the condition in (4.27) becomes γk > γk+1 which is true according to our assump-
tions. Hence the inductive step is complete and the statement is true.
ODE solution
The solution of (4.10) is equivalent to the solution of DVi−
pi
a(1− x)
Vi =
bi
a
+
c
a(1− x)
,
so that it is sufficient to observe that the integrating factor for this first order ODE is
(1− x)
pi
a . Hence the solution follows from
Vi(x) = (1− x)
−
pi
a a−1
∫
(1− x)
pi
a
(
bi +
ci
1− x
)
dx
= K(1− x)−
pi
a −
bi
a+ pi
(1− x)−
c
pi
(4.28)
where K is an arbitrary real constant.
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This chapter is based on two papers Controlling the Katz-Bonacich Centrality in
Social Network: Application to gossip in Online Social Networks and A Continuous
Optimization Approach for Maximizing Content Popularity in Online Social Networks.
In this chapter, the first section is dedicated to the minimization of gossip and the second
section is dedicated to the maximization of popularity.
5.1 Controlling the Katz-Bonacich Centrality in Social
Network: Application to gossip in Online Social
Networks
5.1.1 Introduction
Centrality measures are valuable keys to understanding Social Networks. The most fa-
mous ones are the degree centrality, the betweenness centrality, the closeness centrality
and finally the eigenvector centrality [48]. The popularity of these measures comes from
the fact that they are concerned with links between a given node and the overall network
(a micro perspective) as opposed to the diameter of a graph, the small world property,
etc. (macro perspective). In particular spectral centrality measures of a node depend
on the whole topology of the network. This is one of the main differences between
spectral centrality measures and the others. Among the huge number of applications
of spectral centralities, we will mention two works as examples. In [78], the authors
characterize the optimal targeted marketing strategies in a Social Network by a spectral
centrality measure. The second recent example of application is [103], where authors
use a spectral centrality measure to find the delinquent who, once sent to jail, decreases
the maximum of the population of delinquency profiles.
The control of the spectral centrality score associated with each node, by modifying
the graph topology, is a recent problem. To the best of our knowledge, the very first
paper on this topic concerns the maximization of the PageRank, where a webmaster
controls multiple pages and hyperlinks between them (see related work of [104]). In the
framework of delinquency, the paper [103] proposes to model a network of delinquents
who communicate between themselves and to design an algorithm to characterize the
link to be removed to minimize the overall rate of delinquency. In [105] the authors try
to find the minimum set so that the vector of score is fully controlled.
There are several spectral centrality measures: the eigenvector centrality, the al-
pha centrality, the Katz-Bonacich centrality, the PageRank1 and the subgraph centrality
[106]. We restrict ourselves to the Katz-Bonacich centrality. Indeed, in this case we are
able to derive an efficient algorithm to control this centrality by choosing which nodes
1 see [48] for definitions of the above spectral centrality measures
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to remove. The score given by the Katz-Bonacich centrality to a node is based on a
discounted sum of the walks that initially have started from it. There are applications
in Social Network that use it. For instance, in [103], the authors use the Katz-Bonacich
centrality to characterize the key delinquent. In other contexts, the Katz-Bonacich cen-
trality has been used in a pricing context [107], to characterize the Nash equilibrium of
a Cournot competition over a network [83] and in other economic and social network
applications [108; 109; 110].
This section focuses on deriving an efficient algorithm to optimize the Katz-
Bonacich centrality by removing nodes. We prove that it is equivalent to a linear pro-
gramming formulation and that there is a polynomial solution algorithm. Thus algo-
rithms from [111] can be used in the context of large graphs. Once the linear program-
ming characterization is provided, our goal is to propose an application of the control
of the Katz-Bonacich centrality based on the minimization of a gossip process over an
online Social Network.
After a short related works section, we introduce, in section 5.1.3, the Katz-
Bonacich centrality optimization problem. We recall the mathematical definition of
Katz-Bonacich centrality. We then prove its equivalence with a linear programming
problem. In section 5.1.4, we apply the Katz-Bonacich centrality minimization problem
to the control of a gossip process over an OSN. Finally, we compute the solution of the
Katz-Bonacich centrality minimization problem on real networks in section 5.1.5.
5.1.2 Related works
The control of the spectral centrality has been studied from different points of view:
Topology Control. Lately, the question of how to modify the topology of the net-
work in order to control the centrality score of nodes became a subject of interest.
In [105], an algorithm is proposed to find the minimum controlling centrality subset of
nodes in a complex network in the particular case of the eigenvector centrality. The
authors only control interactions generated by nodes inside this subset.
In [104] the authors noticed the links between the optimization of the PageRank and the
ergodic Markov decision problem. Based on it, they provide an efficient algorithm to
optimize the PageRank.
Key node. Another question has also been investigated on how the centrality score
of nodes evolves when a node is removed from the network.
In [103; 112], the authors highlight the equivalence between the delinquency effort level
and the Katz-Bonacich centrality. Then they find which delinquent has to be in jail such
that the global delinquent profile decreases to the maximum.
In [113; 114], the authors investigate the control of the eigenvalue centrality. Their
study is based on the theory of control of linear system and the well-known Kalman’s
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Table 5.1: Main notations used throughout the section 5.1
Symbol Meaning
G (I ,E) social network
I set of nodes
E adjacency matrix
ρ discount rate
pi probability to keep node i
x∗(E,ρ) Katz-Bonacich centrality associated with G (I ,E) and ρ ∈
R+
C number of regions in the graph
φc constraint over the Katz-Bonacich centrality in region c
Yi(n) cumulative interest of node i at time n; xi(n) =
Yi(n)
n
x(n) := (x1(n), . . . ,xI(n))
λi rate at which node i receives news
αi rate at which node i updates its interest
controllability rank condition [115]. They find which node can control the whole system
based on results from [116].
5.1.3 Control of the Katz-Bonacich centrality
As previously mentioned, the focus of this study is to provide an efficient algorithm
to solve the Katz-Bonacich centrality optimization problem. We first recall the defini-
tion of the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure. We then, formally, describe the Katz-
Bonacich centrality optimization problem. The main symbols used in this section are
reported in Tab. 5.1. We begin our analysis by recalling the definition of the Katz-
Bonacich centrality. In one of his works [117], made in the 50s, Katz proposed to model
the centrality or the prestige of a node in a network in the following manner: the score
associated with a node is based on a discounted sum of the walks that initially started
from it. Nowadays, this centrality measure is called Katz-Bonacich centrality because
in [118] Bonacich proposed a similar spectral centrality measure. We next provide a
formal definition of it.
The social network G (I ,E) is composed of a set I := {1, . . . , I} of nodes
and the interactions between them is described by a communication matrix E. The
variable ei j ∈ [0,1] denotes the i j
th entry of E and represents the relative frequency
of interaction between node i ∈ I and node j ∈ I . Moreover, for each i, we assume
that ∑
j
ei j = 1 except when a node does not communicate with any other nodes and
therefore ∑
j
ei j = 0. The definition of the Katz-Bonacich centrality [117], is given by:
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Definition 5.1. Consider ρ ∈ [0,1]. The Katz-Bonacich centrality associated with
G (I ,E), denoted by x∗(E,ρ) ∈ RI+, is given by:
x∗(E,ρ) :=
∞
∑
n=0
(ρE)n1I , (5.1)
where 1I is the all ones vector of size I. Thus the Katz-Bonacich centrality is the limit,
as t goes to infinity (whenever it exists), of the following deterministic process, where
for each t ∈ N∗:
xi(t + 1) = 1+∑
j
ρei jx j(t),∀i. (5.2)
Moreover, if the Perron Frobenius eigenvalue (see [119]), λmax(ρE), associated
with the matrix ρE is smaller than one, then:
x∗(E,ρ) = (IdI −ρE)−11I , (5.3)
where IdI is the identity matrix of size I × I.
The problem we are interested in is the minimization (or the maximization) of the
Katz-Bonacich centrality by removing nodes, in other words by controlling the commu-
nication matrix E. The variable pi ∈ [pi, pi] denotes the probability of keeping a node
i and (1− pi) the probability of removing it. Thus the Katz-Bonacich centrality is now
in expectation, for each i, the limit lim
t→∞
E[xi(t)] (which exists if λmax(ρE) < 1) of the
following dynamical system:
E[xi(t + 1)] = E[1+∑
j
ρei jx j(t)] (5.4)
= pi(1+∑
j
ρei jE[x j(t)]). (5.5)
Moreover, we assume that the Katz-Bonacich cannot be lower than a certain level in
some regions of the graph. Let c ∈ {1, . . . ,C} be a particular region of the graph. Let
N(c) ⊂ I be the subset of nodes that belongs to the region c. For each c and c′, we
assume that N(c)∩N(c′) = /0. For each region c, the constraint over Katz-Bonacich
centrality is:
∑
j∈N(c)
x∗j ≥ φc, (5.6)
where φc ≥ 0. These region constraints come from the fact it is not possible to remove
all the nodes of the graph. The Katz-Bonacich centrality minimization problem is
therefore defined as follows :
Definition 5.2. For each i, let pi ∈ [pi, pi] be the probability of removing node i and p :=
(p1, . . . , pI) the associated vector. Let P := Πi[pi, pi] be the set of constraints. Consider
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ρ ∈ [0,1]. Let E be a sub-stochastic matrix and λmax(ρE)< 1. Let φ := (φ1, . . . ,φC) be
the region constraints. The Katz-Bonacich centrality minimization problem associated
with (E,ρ) is defined as:
min
p∈P
∑
i
x∗i (p), (5.7)
where for each i, x∗i is the unique solution of:
x∗i (p) = pi(1+∑
j
ρei jx
∗
j(p)), (5.8)
such that for each c,
∑
j∈N(c)
x∗j(p) ≥ φc. (5.9)
Our main result is to provide an equivalence between the Katz-Bonacich centrality
minimization problem and a linear programme. Our goal is to first compute, for a given
centrality, a closed form of the control that allows us to reach it. Then given a particular
matrix E and a scalar ρ we will describe the set of feasible centralities. Finally, we will
prove the equivalence between the Katz-Bonacich centrality minimization with a linear
programme. The region constraints will only appear in the formulation of the linear
programme.
Proposition 5.3. Consider k ∈ RI+, E and ρ . If for each i,
p
i
≤
ki
1+∑ j ρei jk j
≤ pi, (5.10)
and if for each i, x∗i is the unique solution of:
x∗i (p
∗) = p∗i (1+∑
j
ρei jx
∗
j(p
∗)), (5.11)
where
p∗i =
ki
1+∑ j ρei jk j
, ∀i (5.12)
then x∗i (p
∗) = ki for all i.
Now we are interested in understanding the set of feasible centralities, in other words
to characterize the following set:
F :=
{
k ∈ RI+ | ∃p ∈ P such that k sol. of (5.11)
}
. (5.13)
The next proposition characterizes this set:
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Proposition 5.4. Consider E and ρ .
F =
{
k | ∀i, ki ≥ 0, pi ≤
ki
1+∑ j ρei jk j
≤ pi,
}
. (5.14)
Now according to the two previous propositions we can deduce that the Katz-
Bonacich centrality minimization problem is equivalent to:
min
k
∑
i
ki (5.15)
subject to for each i and each c:
p
i
(
1+∑
j
ρei jk j
)
≤ ki, (5.16)
pi
(
1+∑
j
ρei jk j
)
≥ ki, (5.17)
∑
j∈N(c)
k j ≥ φc, (5.18)
0 ≤ ki. (5.19)
Once this linear programme is solved the associated control is the one proposed in
proposition 5.3. Because it exists a linear programme equivalent to the Katz-Bonacich
centrality minimization problem, we can use algorithm proposed in [111] for large
graphs.
5.1.4 Which nodes to remove in a gossip process
The problem we are interested in is the minimization of the gossip propagation by
removing nodes. We call this challenge the Gossip Minimization problem. As proposed
in [109] the owner of the OSN (the controller) is allowed to block users. For instance,
by sending a warning to the friends of a user, the controller disturbs communication
between them. A different take of this section can be found in [120].
Let I := {1, . . . , I} be the set of users and i ∈ I be a user index. A user i of a
social network gets news, about the gossip according to a Poisson point process of
intensity λi ∈ R+. Thus when a news arrival occurs, concerning the gossip, the
probability that it is for user i is:
λi
∑ j λ j
.
Let tn ∈ R+ be the arrival rate of the n
th message. When a user i receives news, it
increases his belief in the gossip. Thus the interest of an average user in the gossip at
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time tn, is described by a random variable Yi(n) ∈ N. Let xi(n) :=
Yi(n)
n
be the time
average interest of user i at time tn. Thus, for each i the evolution of Yi is described by:
Yi(n+ 1) = Yi(n)+ ζi(n),
where the interest update is modeled by:
ζi(n) :=



1 w.p
λi
∑ j λ j
,
0 w.p 1−
λi
∑ j λ j
.
(5.20)
As an extension of the previous model, we consider that interest imitation can occur
between users. Let E ∈ [0,1]I×I be the imitation matrix, where the i j-entry of E, ei j,
is the probability that a user i imitates interest of user j. For each i, we assume that
∑
j
ei j = 1. The time instant when a user i decides to imitate one of his neighbours is
modeled by a Poisson point process of intensity αi ∈ R+. An event is now the arrival
of messages or the activation of a user who wants to imitate someone. When an event
occurs, the probability that it is the imitation phase of user i is
αi
∑ j λ j +α j
. At event n,
when user i imitates user j, he will add one to Yi(n) with probability x j(n). Thus the new
version of ζ (n) := (ζ1(n), . . . ,ζI(n)), associated with the evolution of Y = (Y1, . . . ,YI),
is described below:
ζi(n) =



1 w.p Pi(x(n)) :=
λi
∑ j λ j +α j
+αi
∑ j ei jx j(n)
∑ j λ j +α j
0 w.p 1−Pi(x(n)).
(5.21)
Following the theory developed in [46], the next theorem provides a sufficient
condition about the convergence of the sequence {x(n)}.
Theorem 5.5. [46] Let x0 ∈ [0,1]I be the initial conditions. If the matrix A defined as
follows,
ai j :=
αiei j
∑
I
i′′=1 λi′′ +αi′′
−1i= j,
is irreducible then the sequence {x(n)} converges almost surely to an unique rest point
x∗ ∈ [0,1]I . Moreover,
x = A−1Λ, (5.22)
where Λ := (
λ1
∑
I
i′′=1 λi′′ +αi′′
, . . . ,
λI
∑
I
i′′=1 λi′′ +αi′′
).
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It is interesting to note that the rest point of the stochastic approximation (5.21) is
the Katz Bonacich centrality of the graph defined by the following matrix C, where the
i j-entry is given by
ci j :=
αiei j
∑i′ λi′ +αi′
.
Control description. In the Gossip minimization problem, the controller can de-
cide which users to block. More precisely, he can reduce the impact of user i over his
neighbours using a control pi ∈ [pi, pi], such that the interest of each user i is solution
of the following linear system:
x∗i = pi(
λi
∑ j λ j +α j
+αi
∑ j ei jx
∗
j
∑ j λ j +α j
). (5.23)
Moreover, because the controller cannot fully control the interest of each user, the
sum of the interests of each user cannot be lower than a certain level:
∑
j
x∗j ≥ φ , (5.24)
where φ > 0.
Utility description. In the present section, we assume that the controller wishes
to minimize a utility vector depending on the interest of each user. Then the Gossip
minimization problem is:
min
p∈P
U(x∗). (5.25)
where for each i, x∗i is the unique solution of:
x∗i = pi(
λi
∑ j λ j +α j
+αi
∑ j ei jx
∗
j
∑ j λ j +α j
), (5.26)
subject to
∑
j
x∗j ≥ φ . (5.27)
We shall be interested in reducing the overall interest, in other words:
U(x) := ∑
i
x∗i . (5.28)
Finally, according to the previous section 5.1.3, the Gossip minimization problem is
equivalent to the following linear programming:
min
k
∑
i
ki (5.29)
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Network I d ∑
i
x∗i ∑
i
x∗i (p)
Zachary’s karate club [122] 34 9.2 37.8 20
Miserables [123] 77 13.2 85.5 20
Network of American college football games [124] 115 21.3 127.8 20
Dolphin social network [125] 62 10.3 68.9 20
Table 5.2: Summary table
subject to for each i:
p
i
(
λi
∑ j λ j +α j
+αi
∑ j ei jk j
∑ j λ j +α j
)
≤ ki, (5.30)
pi
(
λi
∑ j λ j +α j
+αi
∑ j ei jk j
∑ j λ j +α j
)
≥ ki, (5.31)
∑
j
k j ≥ φ , (5.32)
0 ≤ ki. (5.33)
It is easy to generalize to a convex utility function. Indeed, as U(xi
∗) is convex in xi
∗,
we can use classical convex optimization algorithm [121] to solve this problem.
5.1.5 Simulations
In this section we compute over different networks the solution of the Katz-Bonacich
centrality minimization problem. We study it over 4 different topologies depicted in fig.
5.1. The summary of experimental results are described in table 5.2. The first column
provides the number of nodes, the second column the average degree (d). We study each
network with its normalized adjacency matrix E, where the i j-entry is given by: ei j :=
ai j
∑ j ai j
, where A is the real adjacency matrix. For each network, the Katz-Bonacich
centrality is computed with ρ = 0.1. The centrality average value of each network
is given in the third column. We applied the Katz-Bonacich centrality minimization
problem with, C = 1, φC = 20 and for each i, pi = 0.1 and pi = 1. The fourth column
describes the utility of the Katz-Bonacich centrality minimization problem. The first
observation is, that for each network, the constraint ∑
i
x∗i ≥ 20, is saturated. It follows
from the fact that, for each network, the aggregated Katz-Bonacich centrality is bigger
than 20. We expect that if we increase p
i
this constraint will not be saturated anymore.
When we look at fig. 5.1, where the size of the node is proportional to the solution of
the Katz-Bonacich centrality minimization problem (x∗i for each i), we remark that we
do not have a trivial solution such as only one node being active or each node having
the same centrality.
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Figure 5.1: Visualization of the solution of the Katz-Bonacich centrality minimization prob-
lem
5.1.6 Conclusion and Perspectives
The main result of this section is the equivalence between a linear programming prob-
lem and the Katz-Bonacich centrality minimization problem. Once this equivalence is
proved, we also describe an application to the control of gossip on OSN.
There is one major follow-up of this work. The extension is to study the Katz-
Bonacich centrality minimization problem in an online context, in other words when
the structure of the social network changes over time. The formulation of the problem
could be the following: The evolution of the interaction occurs each unit time t ∈ N.
Let E(t) be the interaction matrix at time t. For each t we assume that E(t) a
substochastic matrix. The index pi(t) ∈ [0,1] denotes the node i that the controller will
perturbate at time t. The online version of the Katz-Bonacich centrality minimization
problem is defined as follows:
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Known parameters:. Set of nodes I .
For each round t = 1,2, . . .
1. The controller removes nodes by using a control p(t) := (p1(t), . . . , pI(t)),
2. simultaneously, the adversary select a matrix E(t) of interaction, ρ(t) and α(t),
3. The controller observes E(t), and receives
1TI (IdI −ρ(t)E(t))
−11Iα(t),
as an instantaneous payoff vector.
In order to solve this problem we can use the theory of online convex optimization
techniques [126].
5.2 A Continuous Optimization Approach for Maximiz-
ing Content Popularity in Online Social Networks
5.2.1 Introduction
In this section, we propose a novel approach for maximizing content popularity, where
a source controls the flow of posted contents and the topics associated with each con-
tent. We develop an algorithm to find the optimal solution to this problem: In order to
provide an answer to this challenge of popularity in OSNs, our methodology pursues
the following steps.
• We start by understanding how content popularity behaves on OSNs. A vast
amount of literature about this question exists (for instance [18; 13] and refer-
ences therein). We follow the bottom line of the work proposed in [21] in which
the authors consider that the popularity of content is highly related to its position
in a News Feed. In Facebook for example, a News Feed is a feed where the user’s
friends and subscribed pages’ posts are published. These posts are displayed in a
top-down anti-chronological order from the newest to the oldest. More explana-
tions about the News Feed dynamics and models are provided in [21].
• Then, we assume that the maximization of content popularity is similar to the
oil producer problem [127]. This problem assumes that an oil producer would
pump oil from a single well and after some time, when the return on the well
decreases, he would abandon that source and start exploiting another one. In the
case of OSNs, we assume that a well pumping is equivalent to a content staying
in the first position of the News Feed. At some point, the popularity return will
decrease and it is recommended to send a new message, meaning to exploit a new
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source. Our model of popularity is expressed as a system of discrete differential
equations.
• Finally, we study the maximization of content popularity. We assume that a com-
pany (or source) that tries to be popular will focus on two types of control: the
number of posted contents and the topics of its messages. A continuous for-
mulation of the popularity maximization problem is proposed and we prove its
equivalence with a "generalized" fractional programme.
Organization of the section. In section 5.2.3, we propose a mathematical model
of the popularity. The section 5.2.4 is about the Popularity maximization problem.
First, we provide its definition, and then we prove its equivalence with a pseudoconcave
optimization problem. Finally, an algorithm that converges to the optimal solution is
provided.
5.2.2 Data experiment: importance of the first position
In this section, we explain how the popularity of a content is related to the position
in the News Feed, specifically the duration the content spend in the first position in the
News Feed. Our dataset is composed of messages posted on a Facebook page associated
with a french political personality (Anne Hidalgo2). We have extracted 892 messages
messages and 39083 associated comments using the Netvizz app [19]. The dataset
was collected from June 15 2013 to December 01 2014. Messages and comments are
associated with timestamps. The histogram in fig. 5.2 shows that more than 70% of
the posted contents reached 80% of their total popularity while the content is in the first
position in the News Feed. Therefore it makes sense to consider a popularity model,
described in detail in the next section, by assuming that almost all the popularity of a
content is obtained while the content is in the first position in the News Feed.
5.2.3 Popularity model
The main symbols used in this section are reported in Tab. 5.3. The level of popularity
associated with a topic is defined as the total number of comments, given by OSN sub-
scribers, of all contents related to this topic. We model the dynamic of the popularity
of each topic through a discrete time equation. Let c ∈ C := {1, . . .C} be a topic index.
The random state variable Xc(t) ∈ N+ is the total number of comments that gets all
contents related to topic c, at a given time t ∈ R+. For each topic c ∈ C the arrival
process of a type c content in the News Feed is a Poisson Point Process with intensity
0 < λc < ∞. All arrival processes are independent. We also consider that there exists a
flow, with intensity σ of posts which are not related to any topics. Let tm ∈ R+ be the
2https://www.facebook.com/HidalgoAnne
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Figure 5.2: Histogram of first position fraction of popularity
random variable denoting the arrival instant of the mth content, with m ∈ N∗+. As the
arrival processes are independent Poisson Point Processes, the inter-arrival time denoted
by ∆m between consecutive messages arrived at tm and tm−1, follows an exponential dis-
tribution with rate Λ :=
C
∑
d=1
λd +σ . Therefore, the probability associated with the inter
arrival time ∆m of two consecutive messages is given by:
∀m, δ ∈ R+, P(∆m < δ ) =
∫ δ
0
Λe−Λtdt. (5.34)
A content can also be called a post on an OSNs. We define by η(m) ∈ C the topic of
the mth content. According to [82], for each message m, η(m) is a random variable with
the following distribution:
∀m, P(η(m) = c) =
λc
Λ
. (5.35)
The evolution of the cumulative number of comments associated with topic c in a News
Feed, is modeled by the following dynamical system:
Xc(tm) = Xc(tm−1)+ 1{η(m−1)=c}Yc(∆m), (5.36)
Xc(t1) = 0, (5.37)
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Table 5.3: Main notations used throughout the section 5.2
Symbol Meaning
C set of topics
Xc(t) cumulative popularity associated with topic c, at time t
λc contents arrival rate concerning topic c
tm arrival instant of the m
th content
∆m inter-arrival time between message m and m−1
η(m) topic of the mth content
Yc(δ ) cumulative popularity obtained by a content of type c that
stays δ units of time on the first position
γc linear cost associated with λc
where the random variable Yc(δ ) ∈ N+, with δ ∈ R+, describes the cumulative
popularity obtained by a content of type c that stays δ units of time on the first position
of the News Feed and 1{η(m−1)=c} = 1 if the (m−1)
th content is of type c, it is equal to
0 otherwise. It has been recently demonstrated in [128] that the exponential model is a
good approximation of the cumulative popularity. Thus we assume that for each c, the
random variable Yc(δ ) is described by a non-homogeneous Poisson process of intensity
E[Yc(δ )] :=
∫ δ
0
e−αcτdτ where αc ∈ R
+ is called the coefficient of innovation. A
closed form expression of the expected cumulative popularity for each topic c is given
in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.6. The expected cumulative popularity when the mth content is posted is
given by:
∀c ∈ C , tm ∈ R
∗
+, E[Xc(tm)] = m
λc
αc
(
1
Λ+σ
−
1
Λ+σ +αc
)
. (5.38)
5.2.4 Popularity optimization
We now study the case where a single source maximizes the popularity of his content.
The source determines the topics of his contents and also the rate of contents per topic.
The source parameters are described by the vector (λ1, . . . ,λC) where λc ∈ [0,λ ] is the
rate of contents related with topic c and λ is the maximum rate for each topic. Based
on proposition 1, the average expected cumulative popularity X∞c associated with the
content related to topic c posted by the source is equal to:
∀c ∈ C , X∞c := limm→∞
1
m
E[Xc(tm)] =
λc
αc
(
1
Λ+σ
−
1
Λ+αc +σ
)
. (5.39)
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Let λcost :=
C
∑
c=1
γcλc be the global cost perceived by the source for sending all his con-
tents. This cost is considered to be in monetary units and we assume that the source
wants to maximize the sum of its total average expected cumulative popularity minus
the global cost λcost . The utility of the source is thus defined as follows:
U(λ1, . . . ,λC) :=
C
∑
c=1
λc
αc
(
1
Λ+σ
−
1
Λ+αc +σ
)
−
C
∑
c=1
γcλc. (5.40)
The Popularity optimization problem is the optimization problem defined below:
max
λc∈[0,λ ], ∀c
U(λ1, . . . ,λC) (5.41)
(λ OA1 , . . . ,λ
OA
C ) = argmaxλc∈[0,λ ], ∀cU(λ1, . . . ,λC) (5.42)
The purpose of the rest of this section is to find an equivalent form of the Popularity
optimization problem that can be solved efficiently. Indeed, this optimization problem
is not a concave optimization problem as it can be observed in fig. 5.3. However, we
Figure 5.3: Plot of U(λ1,λ2) with σ = 1, α1 = 2, α2 = 5 and γ1 = γ2 = 0.01.
can see that the global optimum point is such that λ2 = 0. Thus, in this particular case,
it is optimal for the source to send contents only about a single and unique topic. We
next generalize and prove this observation. The next theorem proves that the optimal
vector rate for the source is to send content only related to a single and unique topic.
Therefore, the Popularity optimization problem defined in (5.41) can be reduced to a
simpler optimization problem.
Proposition 5.7. If for each c and c′ and for all x ∈ [0,Cλ ]
1
(x+σ)(x+σ +αc)
− γc 6=
1
(x+σ)(x+σ +αc′)
− γc′ , (5.43)
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then λ OAc := (0, . . . ,0,λc∗ ,0, . . . ,0) where c
∗ and λ ∗c are solutions of the following opti-
mization problem:
max
c
[
max
λ∈[0,λ ]
{
λ
αc
(
1
λ +σ
−
1
λ +σ +αc
)}
− γcλ
]
. (5.44)
The hypothesis made in the previous proposition is satisfied when γc = γc′ and αc 6=
αc′ for all c, c
′. According to the previous proposition 5.7, the Popularity optimization
problem is now equivalent to the following generalized fractional problem:
max
c
[
max
λ∈[0,λ ]
{
λ
αc
(
1
λ +σ
−
1
λ +σ +αc
)}
− γcλ
]
, (5.45)
A generalized fractional problem [61] is described by the following optimiza-
tion problem: max
x
min
i
{
fi(x)
gi(x)
}. We define for each topic c ∈ C the function
Uc(λ ) =
λ
αc
(
1
λ +σ
−
1
λ +σ +αc
)
− γcλ . In the next proposition we prove the
pseudo-concavity of the function Uc(λ ) for any topic c ∈ C .
Proposition 5.8. For each c ∈ C , a projected gradient algorithm, where the update is
proposed in (5.46), will converge to the optimal solution of Uc(λ ).
We have formulated the Popularity optimization problem as a generalized fractional
problem and we prove that the sub-optimization problem is pseudo-concave. Consider-
ing such gradient algorithm, we finally propose a global algorithm that first looks for the
optimal rate for each topic c and then determines, by comparing all the outputs of the
C gradient algorithms, on which topic the source has to send his contents. We describe
the updating rule in the equation below.
Algorithm
1. Initialization: For each c ∈ {1, . . . ,C}, λc(1) ∈ [0,λ ] randomly. The
horizon T of gradient algorithms is chosen.
2. Updating rule: For each c ∈ {1, . . . ,C} and for each round t = 1,2, . . . ,T ,
the source updates the vector λc(t):
λc(t + 1) = Γ2
[
λc(t)+α
∂Uc
∂λc
(λc(t))
]
, (5.46)
where Γ2[·] is the projection over interval [0,λ ] and α(t) is chosen accord-
ing to the rule describes in [60].
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Figure 5.4: Numerical illustration of the algorithm.
3. Solve:
c∗ = arg max
c∈{1,...,C}
{Uc(λc(T ))} .
We illustrate our algorithmic solution on a numerical example where the parameters
are C = 3, (α1,α2,α3) = (10,5,50). In fig. 5.4, each curve draws the utility in the case
when the source decides to send content related to a unique topic. Each dashed line
shows the iteration of the gradient algorithm for each type c. We observe the conver-
gence of the gradient in each case as stated previously. The last iteration of the algorithm
is not shown in fig. 5.4 , but it is easy to deduce that the source has to create contents
about the second topic, in order to become popular.
5.2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this section, we have defined a popularity optimization problem in OSNs. The model
is based on the observation that most of the popularity of a content is obtained during
the time a content is in the first position in a News Feed. We define an optimization
problem where a source decides the rate of his content and also the topics. An
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equivalent fractional problem is obtained and an efficient algorithm that converges to
the optimal solution is proposed.
APPENDIX
Proof of proposition 5.3:
If
p
i
≤
ki
1+∑ j ρei jk j
≤ pi, (5.47)
then p∗i ∈ [pi, pi]. This is the reason why p
∗
i exists. Moreover, for each i
x∗i = p
∗
j(1+∑
j
ρei jx
∗
j) (5.48)
x∗i =
ki
1+∑ j ρei jk j
(1+∑
j
ρei jx
∗
j). (5.49)
This linear system admit a unique solution. And it is easy to check that the unique
solution is x∗i = ki:
ki =
ki
1+∑ j ρei jk j
(1+∑
j
ρei jk j) (5.50)
ki = ki. (5.51)
Proof of proposition 5.4:
According to the proposition 5.3, it exists p such that x∗i = ki if for each i:
p
i
≤
ki
1+∑ j ρei jk j
≤ pi. (5.52)
Proof of proposition 5.6:
For each topic c ∈ C and for each time tm, we have:
E[Xc(tm)] = E[Xc(tm−1)]+E[1η(m)=cYc(∆m)],
= E[Xc(tm−1)]+
λc
Λ+σ
∫ ∞
0
(Λ+σ)e−(Λ+σ)τ
∫ τ
0
e−αct
′
dt ′dτ ,
= E[Xc(tm−1)]+
λc
αc
(
1
Λ+σ
−
1
Λ+σ +αc
)
,
as the inter-arrival time between two consecutive contents follows an exponential distri-
bution with rate Λ+σ and this duration is independent of the type of content. There-
fore, we repeat this evaluation of the expectation and we get:
∀c ∈ C , tm ∈ R
∗
+, E[Xc(tm)] = m
λc
αc
(
1
Λ+σ
−
1
Λ+σ +αc
)
.
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Proof of proposition 5.7:
We assume that there exits (c,c′)∈C 2 such that λ OAc > 0 and λ
OA
c′ > 0. This assumption
implies that
∂U
∂λc
(λ OA1 , . . . ,λ
OA
C ) = 0 (5.53)
∂U
∂λc′
(λ OA1 , . . . ,λ
OA
C ) = 0 (5.54)
We compute the partial derivative which is equal to
∂U
∂λc
(λ OA1 , . . . ,λ
OA
C ) =
1
(∑d λ
OA
d +σ)(∑d λ
OA
d +σ +αc)
−∑
d′
λd′
(∑d λ
OA
d +σ)
2(∑d λ
s
dsOA+σ +αd′)
−∑
d′
λd′
(∑d λ
OA
d +σ)(∑d λ
OA
d +σ +αd′)
2
− γc.
We deduce from the previous equations and from the stationary condition (5.53), (5.54)
that, for each c and c′
1
(∑d λ
OA
d +σ)(∑d λ
OA
d +σ +αc)
− γc =
1
(∑d λ
OA
d +σ)(∑d λ
OA
d +σ +αc′)
− γc′ .
(5.55)
These equations contradict the assumption (5.43) made in the theorem. Thus there is
only stationary point of the form : λ OAc = 1c=c′λ
OA for each c′ ∈ C . The rest of the
theorem follows from this conclusion.
Proof of proposition 5.8:
We first prove that, for each c, Uc(·) is pseudo concave. Then the projected gradient
algorithm described in [60] converges to the global optimum. It remains to show the
pseudo concavity of Uc()̇ in λ . Consider c ∈ C and λ ∈ {x ∈ [0,λ ] | U(x,p) ≥ 0}.
λ OAc ∈ {x ∈ [0,λ ] |U(x,p)≥ 0} because if λ
OA
c is such that U(λ
OA
c ,p)< 0, λ
OA
c can be
equal to 0 to get a better payoff. We can rewrite Uc(λ ) as a fractional problem:
Uc(λ ) =
1
αc
λ
(
1
λ +σ
−
1
λ +σ +αc
)
− γcλ (5.56)
=
λ
(λ +σ)(λ +σ +αc)
− γcλ (5.57)
=
λ − γcλ (λ +σ)(λ +σ +αc)
(λ +σ)(λ +σ +αc)
. (5.58)
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Consider hc(λ ) := λ − γcλ (λ +σ)(λ +σ +αc) and g(λ ) := (λ +σ)(λ +σ +αc).
According to theorem 5.17 p.162 of [61] if hc(λ ) is nonnegative, concave and differen-
tiable and g(λ ) is positive, convex and differentiable, then
hc(λ )
g(λ )
is pseudoconcave. It
is easy to note g(λ ) is a convex function differentiable and positive. As a polynomial,
hc(λ ) is differentiable, hc(λ ) is positive because of λ ∈ {x ∈ [0,λ ] | U(x,p) ≥ 0}.
About the concavity of hc(λ ), the second derivative of hc(λ ) is equal to:
∂ 2hc
∂λ 2
(λ ) = −2γcλ −2γc(λ +σ +αc)−2γc(λ +σ), (5.59)
and we deduce that
∂ 2 f
∂λ 2
(λ ) ≤ 0 for all λ ∈ {x ∈ [0,λ ] |U(x,p) ≥ 0}. This establishes
the peusoconcavity of Uc and concludes the proof.
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6.1 Conclusions
In this PhD thesis, we model complex behaviour of OSNs users by using Game
Theory and stochastic processes. These approaches allow us to discover paradoxes and
inefficiency phenomena that cannot be observed by using data analysis. We believe
that, with the theoretical results obtained during this PhD thesis, it is possible to help the
different actors of OSNs (sources, readers and OSN owner) to use it more effectively.
In the rest of the section we summarize the result obtain during this PhD thesis.
In chapter 2 we have defined a routing game where sources try to maximize their
visibility in News Feeds. They can decide how many messages they have to post,
the topic of their messages and in which News Feed to post. We prove that the Nash
equilibrium is unique and we provide a mathematical closed form of it. We develop
a decentralized algorithm that converges to the NE. Finally, we model the situation
where there are multiple news feeds and we compute the symmetric Nash equilibrium
in this case. The study of the Nash equilibrium leads us to the following observations.
Firstly, when a source maximizes his visibility, it is optimal for him to send messages
about a unique topic, which is negative in terms of content diversity in OSNs. Secondly
the flow sent by the sources at the unique Nash equilibrium is concave quadratic in the
number of players. Therefore, when the number of players increases, the equilibrium
flow will increase up to a threshold, then it will decrease. Thirdly, we extend our work
to multiple news feeds, where the sharing phenomenon is modeled. In chapter 2 the
model proposed is not a dynamical one, which is a strong assumption. In chapter 3 we
relax this hypothesis.
In chapter 3 the posting behaviour of sources in OSNs is modeled by using
stochastic approximation. The sources have influence one over another. We develop a
content active filtering in order to increase content diversity. Sufficient conditions, over
the externalities matrix, are given in order to ensure the convergence of the posting
behaviour. Moreover, we develop an equivalent game theoretical model. Finally, all the
theoretical results are illustrated through simulations and a data set extracted from a
real OSN is used to assess our results. This chapter is more practical because once we
extract the influence matrix we can control the posting behaviour by using the CAF. In
chapter 2 and 3 we assume that the control of sources is the number of posted messages.
We introduce a new control, the payment strategy.
In chapter 4, we introduce a differential game to model advertisement in online
content diffusion, where sources compete to make contents popular. We demonstrate
that in discounted infinite horizon case the closed loop best Nash equilibrium is
bang-bang type in the view count. Moreover, we found that dual counterparts exist in
the fully asymmetric case for small discounts. The practical implications of this chapter
is the following: From the sources point of view, the optimal strategy that maximize
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the Nash equilibrium is bang-bang, and so by estimating parameters of the model it is
easy to implement in a real scenario.
Chapter 5 is dedicated to two optimization problems found in OSNs. The first
one is the minimization of gossip propagation, which we simulate on real network
situations. We prove that it is equivalent to a convex programming problem and
therefore, simple to implement. The second optimization problem of this chapter is
concerned with popularity optimization in OSN. We propose a more realistic model
than the one developed in the previous chapter, because we are not in a game theoretical
framework. This problem is demonstrated to be equivalent to a "generalized" fractional
program and we provide an algorithm that converges to the optimal solution.
6.2 Perspectives
6.2.1 Welfare in OSNs: a game theory approach
According to the American customer satisfaction index1, OSNs "are among the
worst-performing companies"2 in term of customer satisfaction. This is the reason why
understanding the needs of users in these particular platforms is becoming a major
issue. In chapter 2 we have studied the behaviour and needs of publishers and we have
provided few insights. However, several questions remain unanswered: How to model
reader’s satisfaction? Which paradoxes can appear when the topology changes over
time? Is it beneficial for a reader to reveal its interests?
These challenges can lead to several possible answers. We present some sugges-
tions for future research:
- Readers incorporation : We study the incorporation of readers in the model proposed
in chapter 2. There is very little literature about game theoretical model with both
sources and readers in OSNs. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one paper
proposing a model [15] where both sources and readers are introduced. Once a model
is proposed, indexes that measure users’ and sources’ satisfaction need to be developed
because the existing ones (for instance, the price of anarchy), are not well adapted.
Moreover, we expect that these indexes will reveal some paradoxes, similar to the
Braess paradox, which can help the OSNs to improve the design of their platform.
- Temporal network : Usually, in a game theoretical framework, a static description (not
a dynamical one), of the relationship between users in OSNs is proposed. However,
1http://www.theacsi.org/
2http://goo.gl/zAvSXl
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we expect that the dynamical topology can have intriguing impacts over the Nash equi-
librium. There are many scenarios that can be modeled where the influence between
sources changes over time. For example, when a source posts many messages about a
particular topic, readers are more likely to unsubscribe to this source. Consequently,
the influence of the source will drastically decrease. In this possible framework, it is of
interest to understand how sources will behave, due to the risk of losing connections,
and which possible new paradoxes will emerge.
- Incomplete information games : In OSNs one fact is clear: Except for the OSNs owner
himself, a random user does not have full information about other users nor about how
they receive contents. Moreover, because there are several users that try to maximize
their own utilities, it is not clear that for particular users, having more information
is a better choice. Indeed, in a seminal paper [129] the authors prove that in a game
theoretical framework, having too much information can be harmful for a player. So it
is of key interest to adapt the framework of incomplete information game to the OSNs
and observe whether or not the value of information is negative or positive for users.
6.2.2 A differential game approach to model popularity competi-
tion in OSNs
ONS platforms have allowed their subscribers to use them for content large scale
dissemination. However, ONSs gives preferential treatment to the publishers who pay
for advertisement. When a user pays for the improvement of his popularity, his strategy
is naturally dynamic. For instance, an intuitive strategy would be to invest as much as
possible in one content until his popularity return becomes low. However, is this simple
strategy still optimal when adopted by many users ? What is the optimal strategy when
a publisher wants to invest in several contents at the same time? Are the popularity
of contents correlated between themselves? If so, what are the benefits resulting from
these correlations?
We propose future lines of research that can lead to interesting answers to the
previous questions:
- Threshold strategy : We would like to see whether or not a threshold strategy (or
bang-bang strategy) is a Nash equilibrium. This implies some theoretical challenges
because the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality (Pontryaguin conditions
and Hamilton Jacobi Bellman conditions) are not well adapted in this context. Assum-
ing that we are able to prove the optimality of a bang bang strategy for both open loop
and closed loop cases, it could be interesting to compare these two strategy. Indeed, the
amount of information required for the computation of both strategies is not the same
and it is not clear which one would be the best in this case.
- Influence effect : Recent papers that model popularity competition by using differential
games do not take into account complex interaction between contents. However, we
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think that a reasonable model would be the one proposed in [130]. This model is based
on an ode system that belongs to the susceptible-infected-susceptible epidemiological
models class. The first step in this study would be to validate the model over real data.
The second step is the computation of a Nash equilibrium and to observe the impact
of the influence between contents over it. It could help the OSNs platforms to design a
better pricing model for advertising.
6.2.3 Optimal control of information diffusion
In times of crisis, it is of main interest for the government to control the information
that propagate on OSNs. One way of doing so is to find the key node, which needs to
be removed from this OSNs by the government so that it will minimize the diffusion
of misinformation. However, how to do so when the network changes over time and
we do not observe these change? Can we design a more realistic model that can lead to
better performance?
- Stochastic approximation scheme : Assuming that the government wants to
know which node to remove in order to minimize the propagation of gossip without
knowing the topology. We first use the model proposed in chapter 5 to model the
propagation of misinformation. If we are able to prove that removing the key node is
equivalent to a convex optimization problem, then we can use a stochastic gradient
approximation scheme [46] to solve the minimization problem without any knowledge
of the diffusion topology. Finally, we can consider that the topology evolves over time
and the online convex optimization theory [131] seems to be adapted to tackle this
problem.
- Consensus model over signed graph : The model proposed in chapter 5 can be seen as
the basic model of the misinformation propagation which is equivalent to the Degroot
consensus model [47]. A simple extension could be to consider that users can trust or
distrust their neighbours and so this model would be consensus over a signed graph.
Now it could be interesting to find whether or not the problem of finding the key node
has an equivalent convex form. Then we can try to solve this extension when the graph
is not known.
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